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Communication and Bargaining Breakdown: An Empirical Analysis

Author

Listed:
  • Matthew Backus
  • Thomas Blake
  • Jett Pettus
  • Steven Tadelis

Abstract

Bargaining breakdown—whether as delay, conflict, or missing trade—plagues bargaining in environments with incomplete information. Can a bargaining environment that facilitates or restricts communication alleviate these costs? We exploit a unique opportunity to study this question using real market transactions: eBay Germany’s Best Offer platform. On May 23, 2016, the platform introduced unstructured communication allowing buyers and sellers on the desktop version of the site, but not the mobile app, to accompany price offers with a message. Using this natural experiment, our difference-in-differences approach documents a 14% decrease in the the rate of breakdown among compliers. Though adoption is immediate, the effect is not. We show, using text analysis, that the dynamics are consistent with repeat players learning how to use communication in bargaining, and that the messaging strategies of experienced sellers are correlated with successful bargaining.

Suggested Citation

  • Matthew Backus & Thomas Blake & Jett Pettus & Steven Tadelis, 2020. "Communication and Bargaining Breakdown: An Empirical Analysis," NBER Working Papers 27984, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:27984
    Note: IO LS POL
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. David Bounies & Antoine Dubus & Patrick Waelbroeck, 2020. "Market for Information and Selling Mechanisms," Working Papers ECARES 2020-07, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    2. David Bounie & Antoine Dubus & Patrick Waelbroeck, 2022. "Collecting and Selling Consumer Information: Selling Mechanisms Matter," Working Papers hal-02288708, HAL.
    3. Matthew Backus & Thomas Blakee & Brad Larsen & Steven Tadelis, 2020. "Sequential Bargaining in the Field: Evidence from Millions of Online Bargaining Interactions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 135(3), pages 1319-1361.
    4. Bonev, Petyo & Matsumoto, Shigeru, 2022. "An empirical evaluation of environmental Alternative Dispute Resolution methods," Economics Working Paper Series 2208, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • M21 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics - - - Business Economics

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