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Optimal Taylor Rules in New Keynesian Models

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  • Christoph E. Boehm
  • Christopher L. House

Abstract

We analyze the optimal Taylor rule in a standard New Keynesian model. If the central bank can observe the output gap and the inflation rate without error, then it is typically optimal to respond infinitely strongly to observed deviations from the central bank's targets. If it observes inflation and the output gap with error, the central bank will temper its responses to observed deviations so as not to impart unnecessary volatility to the economy. If the Taylor rule is expressed in terms of estimated output and inflation then it is optimal to respond infinitely strongly to estimated deviations from the targets. Because filtered estimates are based on current and past observations, such Taylor rules appear to have an interest smoothing component. Under such a Taylor rule, if the central bank is behaving optimally, the estimates of inflation and the output gap should be perfectly negatively correlated. In the data, inflation and the output gap are weakly correlated, suggesting that the central bank is systematically underreacting to its estimates of inflation and the output gap.

Suggested Citation

  • Christoph E. Boehm & Christopher L. House, 2014. "Optimal Taylor Rules in New Keynesian Models," NBER Working Papers 20237, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:20237
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Lars E. O. Svensson, 2003. "What Is Wrong with Taylor Rules? Using Judgment in Monetary Policy through Targeting Rules," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(2), pages 426-477, June.
    3. Marc P. Giannoni & Michael Woodford, 2003. "Optimal Interest-Rate Rules: A General Approach," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000246, UCLA Department of Economics.
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    7. Robert Barsky & Christopher House & Miles Kimball, 2003. "Do Flexible Durable Goods Prices Undermine Sticky Price Models?," Macroeconomics 0302003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Robert Barsky & Christoph E. Boehm & Christopher L. House & Miles Kimball, 2016. "Monetary Policy and Durable Goods," Working Paper Series WP-2016-18, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    2. Christopher J. Gust & Benjamin K. Johannsen & J. David López-Salido, 2015. "Monetary Policy, Incomplete Information, and the Zero Lower Bound," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2015-99, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    3. Christopher Gust & Benjamin K. Johannsen & J. David López-Salido, 2017. "Monetary Policy, Incomplete Information, and the Zero Lower Bound," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 65(1), pages 37-70, April.
    4. Roberto M. Billi, 2020. "Output Gaps and Robust Monetary Policy Rules," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 16(2), pages 125-152, March.
    5. Anthony M. Diercks, 2015. "The Equity Premium, Long-Run Risk, & Optimal Monetary Policy," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2015-87, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    6. Juan Paez-Farrell, 2015. "Taylor rules, central bank preferences and inflation targeting," Working Papers 2015023, The University of Sheffield, Department of Economics.
    7. Anthony Diercks, 2016. "The Equity Premium, Long-Run Risk, and Optimal Monetary Policy," 2016 Meeting Papers 207, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    8. Caines, Colin & Winkler, Fabian, 2021. "Asset price beliefs and optimal monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 53-67.
    9. Colin C. Caines & Fabian Winkler, 2018. "Asset Price Learning and Optimal Monetary Policy," International Finance Discussion Papers 1236, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E3 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles
    • E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
    • E4 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates
    • E43 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
    • E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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