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Tax Structure and Public Sector Growth

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  • Daniel R. Feenberg
  • Harvey S. Rosen

Abstract

It has been hypothesized that a jurisdiction's tax structure exerts an independent effect upon the growth of its public sector. We test this hypothesis by examining the relationship between the growth of state general expenditure and the elasticity of tax revenues with respect to income. The work takes advantage of a very careful set of income elasticities for the personal income and sales tax systems for each state, for every year from 1978 to 1983. The main conclusion is that the data do not support the notion that the form of the tax structure exerts an independent effect on public sector growth.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel R. Feenberg & Harvey S. Rosen, 1986. "Tax Structure and Public Sector Growth," NBER Working Papers 2020, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:2020
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    Cited by:

    1. António Afonso & Ana Patricia Montes & José M. Domínguez, 2024. "Measuring Tax Burden Efficiency in OECD Countries: An International Comparison," CESifo Working Paper Series 11333, CESifo.
    2. Brian Dollery & Andrew Worthington, 1999. "Fiscal Illusion at the Local Level: An Empirical Test Using Australian Municipal Data," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 75(1), pages 37-48, March.
    3. Douglas Holtz-Eakin, 1988. "The Line Item Veto and Public Sector Budgets: Evidence from the States," NBER Working Papers 2531, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Andrew Abbott & Philip Jones, 2016. "Fiscal Illusion and Cyclical Government Expenditure: State Government Expenditure in the United States," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 63(2), pages 177-193, May.
    5. Harold W. Elder, 1992. "Exploring the Tax Revolt: an Analysis of the Effects of State Tax and Expenditure Limitation Laws," Public Finance Review, , vol. 20(1), pages 47-63, January.
    6. Walter Misiolek & Harold Elder, 1988. "Tax structure and the size of government: An empirical analysis of the fiscal illusion and fiscal stress arguments," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 57(3), pages 233-245, June.
    7. Esteller-More, Alex & Sole-Olle, Albert, 2001. "Vertical income tax externalities and fiscal interdependence: evidence from the US," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(2-3), pages 247-272, April.
    8. Howard Chernick, 1997. "Tax Progressivity and State Economic Performance," Economic Development Quarterly, , vol. 11(3), pages 249-267, August.
    9. Boarnet, Marlon G. & Glazer, Amihai, 2002. "Federal grants and yardstick competition," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 53-64, July.
    10. Alejandro Esteller-Moré & Albert Solé-Ollé, 2000. "Vertical income tax externalities and fiscal interdependence: Evidence from the US Model," Working Papers 2000/1, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    11. Alan J. Auerbach, 1990. "Public Sector Dynamics," NBER Working Papers 3508, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. David L. Sjoquist & Mary Beth Walker & Sally Wallace, 2005. "Estimating Differential Responses to Local Fiscal Conditions: A Mixture Model Analysis," Public Finance Review, , vol. 33(1), pages 36-61, January.
    13. Alejandro Esteller-Moré & Albert Solé-Ollé, 2000. "Vertical income tax externalities and fiscal interdependence: Evidence from the US Model," Working Papers 2000/1, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    14. Gilbert E. Metcalf, 1995. "Value-Added Taxation: A Tax Whose Time Has Come?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(1), pages 121-140, Winter.
    15. Michael Marlow & David Joulfaian, 1989. "The determinants of off-budget activity of state and local governments," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 63(2), pages 113-123, November.
    16. Helen F. Ladd, 1993. "State responses to the TRA86 revenue windfalls: A new test of the flypaper effect," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 12(1), pages 82-103.

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