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Debt Fragility and Bailouts

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  • Russell Cooper

Abstract

This paper studies debt fragility and the sharing of the resulting strategic uncertainty through ex post bailouts. Default arises in equilibrium because of both fundamental shocks and beliefs. The probability of default depends on borrowing rates and, in equilibrium, on the beliefs of lenders about this probability. This interaction creates a strategic complementarity and thus the basis for strategic uncertainty. The paper analyzes the role of credible ex post bailouts as a means of sharing both fundamental and strategic uncertainty. While bailouts may occur in some states, debt fragility remains.

Suggested Citation

  • Russell Cooper, 2012. "Debt Fragility and Bailouts," NBER Working Papers 18377, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:18377
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Roch, Francisco & Uhlig, Harald, 2018. "The dynamics of sovereign debt crises and bailouts," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 1-13.
    2. Bigelow, John & Cooper, Russell & Ross, Thomas W, 1993. "Warranties without Commitment to Market Participation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 34(1), pages 85-100, February.
    3. Calvo, Guillermo A, 1988. "Servicing the Public Debt: The Role of Expectations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 647-661, September.
    4. De Grauwe, Paul & Ji, Yuemei, 2012. "Mispricing of Sovereign Risk and Multiple Equilibria in the Eurozone," CEPS Papers 6548, Centre for European Policy Studies.
    5. repec:lic:licosd:30412 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Harold L. Cole & Timothy J. Kehoe, 2000. "Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 67(1), pages 91-116.
    7. Russell Cooper & Hubert Kempf & Dan Peled, 2008. "Is it is or is it ain't your obligation? Regional debt in a fiscal federation," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00310512, HAL.
    8. Russell Cooper & Hubert Kempf & Dan Peled, 2008. "Is It Is Or Is It Ain'T My Obligation? Regional Debt In A Fiscal Federation," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 49(4), pages 1469-1504, November.
    9. Eaton, Jonathan, 1987. "Public Debt Guarantees and Private Capital Flight," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 1(3), pages 377-395, May.
    10. Tirole, Jean, 1985. "Asset Bubbles and Overlapping Generations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(6), pages 1499-1528, November.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Russell Cooper & Kalin Nikolov, 2018. "Government Debt And Banking Fragility: The Spreading Of Strategic Uncertainty," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 59(4), pages 1905-1925, November.
    2. Philipp König & Kartik Anand & Frank Heinemann, 2013. "The ‘Celtic Crisis’: Guarantees, Transparency and Systemic Liquidity Risk," Staff Working Papers 13-31, Bank of Canada.
    3. Giancarlo Corsetti & Luca Dedola, 2016. "The Mystery Of The Printing Press: Monetary Policy And Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 14(6), pages 1329-1371, December.
    4. Giancarlo Corsetti & Luca Dedola, 2012. "The "Mystery of the Printing Press" Monetary Policy and Self-fulfilling Debt Crises," Discussion Papers 1424, Centre for Macroeconomics (CFM), revised Aug 2014.
    5. Christian Grisse & Gisle J. Natvik, 2022. "Sovereign debt crises and cross-country assistance [A pyrrhic victory? Bank bailouts and sovereign credit risk]," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 74(1), pages 178-193.
    6. Saleem Bahaj, 2014. "Systemic Sovereign Risk: Macroeconomic Implications in the Euro Area," Discussion Papers 1406, Centre for Macroeconomics (CFM).
    7. repec:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2013-025 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Roberto Tamborini, 2012. "Market opinions, fundamentals and the euro-sovereign debt crisis," Department of Economics Working Papers 1210, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
    9. Giuliana Passamani & Roberto Tamborini & Matteo Tomaselli, 2014. "Sustainability vs. credibility of fiscal consolidation. A Principal Components test for the Euro Zone," DEM Discussion Papers 2014/09, Department of Economics and Management.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy
    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods

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