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A Brief History of Regulations Regarding Financial Markets in the United States: 1789 to 2009

Author

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  • Alejandro Komai
  • Gary Richardson

Abstract

In the United States today, the system of financial regulation is complex and fragmented. Responsibility to regulate the financial services industry is split between about a dozen federal agencies, hundreds of state agencies, and numerous industry-sponsored self-governing associations. Regulatory jurisdictions often overlap, so that most financial firms report to multiple regulators; but gaps exist in the supervisory structure, so that some firms report to few, and at times, no regulator. The overlapping jumble of standards; laws; and federal, state, and private jurisdictions can confuse even the most sophisticated student of the system. This article explains how that confusion arose. The story begins with the Constitutional Convention and the foundation of our nation. Our founding fathers fragmented authority over financial markets between federal and state governments. That legacy survives today, complicating efforts to create a financial system that can function effectively during the twenty-first century.

Suggested Citation

  • Alejandro Komai & Gary Richardson, 2011. "A Brief History of Regulations Regarding Financial Markets in the United States: 1789 to 2009," NBER Working Papers 17443, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:17443
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    Cited by:

    1. Sylvain Benoit & Jean-Edouard Colliard & Christophe Hurlin & Christophe Pérignon, 2017. "Where the Risks Lie: A Survey on Systemic Risk," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 21(1), pages 109-152.
    2. Masciandaro, Donato & Romelli, Davide, 2015. "Ups and downs of central bank independence from the Great Inflation to the Great Recession: theory, institutions and empirics," Financial History Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 22(3), pages 259-289, December.
    3. Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2019. "Behavioral Monetary Policymaking: Economics, Political Economy and Psychology," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Behavioral Finance The Coming of Age, chapter 9, pages 285-329, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    4. Umlauft, Thomas, 2014. "The Paradoxical Genesis of Too-Big-To-Fail," MPRA Paper 99301, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. repec:fip:fedcwp:13-12 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Mark D. Flood & Jonathan Katz & Stephen J. Ong & Adam Smith, 2013. "Cryptography and the economics of supervisory information: balancing transparency and confidentiality," Working Papers (Old Series) 1312, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    7. Qian Chen & Christoffer Koch & Gary Richardson & Padma Sharma, 2020. "Payments Crises and Consequences," Research Working Paper RWP 20-10, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
    8. Masciandaro Donato, 2012. "Back to the Future?: Central Banks as Prudential Supervisors in the Aftermath of the Crisis," European Company and Financial Law Review, De Gruyter, vol. 9(2), pages 112-130, July.
    9. Alexander Ludwig & Alexander Monge-Naranjo & Ctirad Slavik & Faisal Sohail, 2019. "Financial Liberalization and Income Inequality: On the Heterogenous Effects of Different Reforms," 2019 Meeting Papers 895, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    10. Jihad Dagher, 2018. "Regulatory Cycles: Revisiting the Political Economy of Financial Crises," IMF Working Papers 2018/008, International Monetary Fund.
    11. Paweł Marszałek & Katarzyna Szarzec, 2023. "The good, the bad or the ugly: financialization through heterodox and mainstream lenses," Bank i Kredyt, Narodowy Bank Polski, vol. 54(3), pages 239-258.
    12. A. Podrugina V. & А. Подругина В., 2018. "Ужесточение финансового регулирования: влияние на кредитный цикл США // Tightening Financial Regulation: The Impact on the Credit Cycle in the USA," Мир новой экономики // The world of new economy, Финансовый университет при Правительстве Российской Федерации // Financial University under The Governtment оf The Russian Federation, vol. 12(3), pages 68-81.
    13. Douglas J. Elliott & Greg Feldberg & Andreas Lehnert, 2013. "The History of Cyclical Macroprudential Policy in the United States," Working Papers 13-08, Office of Financial Research, US Department of the Treasury.
    14. Claudio Oliveira De Moraes & Helder Ferreira de Mendonça, 2017. "The bridge between macro and micro banking regulation," Journal of Economic Studies, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 44(2), pages 214-225, May.
    15. Joao Rafael Cunha, 2020. "The Financial Regulatory Cycle," Discussion Paper Series, School of Economics and Finance 202006, School of Economics and Finance, University of St Andrews.
    16. Apostolos Fasianos & Diego Guevara & Christos Pierros, 2016. "Have We Been Here Before? Phases of Financialization within the 20th Century in the United States," Economics Working Paper Archive wp_869, Levy Economics Institute.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • N2 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions
    • N21 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - U.S.; Canada: Pre-1913
    • N22 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - U.S.; Canada: 1913-

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