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The Role of Mortgage Brokers in the Subprime Crisis

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Listed:
  • Antje Berndt
  • Burton Hollifield
  • Patrik Sandås

Abstract

Prior to the subprime crisis, mortgage brokers originated about 65% of all subprime mortgages. Yet little is known about their behavior during the runup to the crisis. Using data from New Century Financial Corporation, we find that brokers earned an average revenue of $5,300 per funded loan. We decompose the broker revenues into a cost and a profit component and find evidence consistent with brokers having market power. The profits earned are different for different types of loans and vary with borrower, broker, regulation and neighborhood characteristics. We relate the broker profits to the subsequent performance of the loans and show that brokers earned high profits on loans that turned out to be riskier ex post.

Suggested Citation

  • Antje Berndt & Burton Hollifield & Patrik Sandås, 2010. "The Role of Mortgage Brokers in the Subprime Crisis," NBER Working Papers 16175, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:16175
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Michael LaCour-Little, 2009. "The Pricing of Mortgages by Brokers: An Agency Problem?," Journal of Real Estate Research, American Real Estate Society, vol. 31(2), pages 235-264.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jason Allen & Robert Clark & Jean-François Houde, 2014. "Price Dispersion in Mortgage Markets," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(3), pages 377-416, September.
    2. Itzhak Ben‐David, 2019. "High Leverage and Willingness to Pay: Evidence from the Residential Housing Market," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 47(3), pages 643-684, September.
    3. Tomasz Piskorski & Amit Seru & James Witkin, 2015. "Asset Quality Misrepresentation by Financial Intermediaries: Evidence from the RMBS Market," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 70(6), pages 2635-2678, December.
    4. Patrick Payne & Tammy Huffman Ph.D, 2012. "Minimizing predatory lending: Designing a long-term compensation structure to minimize the actions of opportunistic mortgage brokers," International Journal of Business and Social Research, LAR Center Press, vol. 2(5), pages 8-19, October.
    5. Shi, Lan & Zhang, Yan, 2018. "The effect of mortgage broker licensing under the originate-to-distribute model: Evidence from the U.S. mortgage market," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 35(PA), pages 70-85.
    6. Eliana Balla & Raymond Brastow & Daniel Edgel & Morgan Rose, 2024. "The Effect of Regulatory Oversight on Nonbank Mortgage Subsidiaries," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 68(3), pages 523-575, April.
    7. Dejan Šoškić, 2015. "Global Financial Reform Since 2008: Achievements and Shortcomings," Panoeconomicus, Savez ekonomista Vojvodine, Novi Sad, Serbia, vol. 62(3), pages 385-400, June.
    8. Shah, Syed Zulfiqar Ali & Akbar, Saeed & Liu, Jia & Liu, Ziyu & Cao, Sichen, 2017. "CEO compensation and banks’ risk-taking during pre and post financial crisis periods," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 1489-1503.
    9. Gene Amromin & Jennifer Huang & Clemens Sialm & Edward Zhong, 2018. "Complex Mortgages [Why don’t lenders renegotiate more home mortgages? Redefaults, self-cures, and securitization]," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 22(6), pages 1975-2007.
    10. Brent W. Ambrose & James N. Conklin, 2014. "Mortgage Brokers, Origination Fees, Price Transparency and Competition," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 42(2), pages 363-421, June.
    11. Maitland MacFarlan, 2017. "House price collapses: policy responses and lessons learned," Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, vol. 80, pages 1-17, December.
    12. Morgan Rose, 2012. "Prepayment Penalties: Efficiency and Predation," Journal of Housing Research, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(2), pages 227-260, January.
    13. Susan E. Woodward & Robert E. Hall, 2012. "Diagnosing Consumer Confusion and Sub-optimal Shopping Effort: Theory and Mortgage-Market Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(7), pages 3249-3276, December.
    14. Patrick Payne & Tammy Huffman Ph.D, 2012. "Minimizing predatory lending: Designing a long-term compensation structure to minimize the actions of opportunistic mortgage brokers," International Journal of Business and Social Research, MIR Center for Socio-Economic Research, vol. 2(5), pages 8-19, October.
    15. Jason Allen & Robert Clark & Jean-François Houde & Shaoteng Li & Anna V. Trubnikova, 2023. "The Role of Intermediaries in Selection Markets: Evidence form Mortgage Lending," NBER Working Papers 31989, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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