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The Effects of Cardiac Specialty Hospitals on the Cost and Quality of Medical Care

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  • Jason R. Barro
  • Robert S. Huckman
  • Daniel P. Kessler

Abstract

The recent rise of specialty hospitals -- typically for-profit firms that are at least partially owned by physicians -- has led to substantial debate about their effects on the cost and quality of care. Advocates of specialty hospitals claim they improve quality and lower cost; critics contend they concentrate on providing profitable procedures and attracting relatively healthy patients, leaving (predominantly nonprofit) general hospitals with a less-remunerative, sicker patient population. We find support for both sides of this debate. Markets experiencing entry by a cardiac specialty hospital have lower spending for cardiac care without significantly worse clinical outcomes. In markets with a specialty hospital, however, specialty hospitals tend to attract healthier patients and provide higher levels of intensive procedures than general hospitals.

Suggested Citation

  • Jason R. Barro & Robert S. Huckman & Daniel P. Kessler, 2005. "The Effects of Cardiac Specialty Hospitals on the Cost and Quality of Medical Care," NBER Working Papers 11707, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11707
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    • I1 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health

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