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Stealth Compensation Via Retirement Benefits

Author

Listed:
  • Lucian Arye Bebchuk
  • Jesse M. Fried

Abstract

This paper analyzes an important form of "stealth compensation" provided to managers of public companies. We show how boards have been able to camouflage large amount of executive compensation through the use of retirement benefits and payments. Our study highlights the significant role that camouflage and stealth compensation play in the design of compensation arrangements. Our study also highlights the significance of whether information about compensation arrangements is not merely publicly available but also communicated in a way that is transparent and accessible to outsiders.

Suggested Citation

  • Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, 2004. "Stealth Compensation Via Retirement Benefits," NBER Working Papers 10742, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10742
    Note: CF LE
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    Cited by:

    1. Kim, Bumjoon & Koo, Minjae, 2024. "Managerial ability and firm’s tweeting activity," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    2. Akram, Farheen & Abrar ul haq, Muhammad, 2018. "Assessing the Effect of Managerial Power on Firm Performance through the Perceptual Lens of Executive Remuneration," MPRA Paper 100050, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2019.
    3. Lily Qiu, 2005. "Managerial Reputation Concerns, Outside Monitoring, and Investment Efficiency," Working Papers 2005-08, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    4. Lu Tang & Shihan Zhang & Chenhui Ding & Jinyao Huan, 2022. "How Can the Sustainable Motivational Effect of Equity Incentives on Corporate Performance Be Exploited?—A Study Based on the Moderating Effect of Aspiration Level," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(24), pages 1-17, December.
    5. Nguyen, Phuong L. & Galpin, Neal & Twite, Garry, 2022. "New active blockholders and adjustment of CEO relative incentive ratios," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    6. Gabriela Grotkowska & Leszek Wincenciak & Tomasz Gajderowicz, 2017. "Evolution of the Public-Sector Wage Premium in Poland," Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, issue 1, pages 5-31.
    7. Marc Hodak, 2014. "The Growing Executive Compensation Advantage of Private Versus Public Companies," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 26(1), pages 20-28, March.
    8. Divya Anantharaman & Vivian W. Fang & Guojin Gong, 2014. "Inside Debt and the Design of Corporate Debt Contracts," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 60(5), pages 1260-1280, May.
    9. Dayani, Arash, 2022. "CEO inside debt and mutual fund investment decisions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 145(C).
    10. Steven Balsam & Erica E. Harris, 2018. "Nonprofit executive incentive pay," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 23(4), pages 1665-1714, December.
    11. Chan, Chia-Ying & Nishikawa, Takeshi & Williams, Thomas C., 2023. "CEO perquisite compensation and M&A performance," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 162-177.
    12. Claudine Salgado & Guilherme Schneider & Cristiano M. Costa, 2022. "Does board interlock affect CEO compensation? Evidence from companies listed in the Brazilian stock exchange," International Journal of Disclosure and Governance, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 19(4), pages 444-465, December.
    13. Yaowen Shan & Terry Walter, 2016. "Towards a Set of Design Principles for Executive Compensation Contracts," Abacus, Accounting Foundation, University of Sydney, vol. 52(4), pages 619-684, December.
    14. Stacey Beaumont & Raluca Ratiu & David Reeb & Glenn Boyle & Philip Brown & Alexander Szimayer & Raymond Silva Rosa & David Hillier & Patrick McColgan & Athanasios Tsekeris & Bryan Howieson & Zoltan Ma, 2016. "Comments on Shan and Walter: ‘Towards a Set of Design Principles for Executive Compensation Contracts’," Abacus, Accounting Foundation, University of Sydney, vol. 52(4), pages 685-771, December.
    15. Agyei-Boapeah, Henry & Ntim, Collins G. & Fosu, Samuel, 2019. "Governance structures and the compensation of powerful corporate leaders in financial firms during M&As," Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, Elsevier, vol. 37(C).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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