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Interdependent Security: A General Model

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  • Geoffrey Heal
  • Howard Kunreuther

Abstract

In an interdependent world the risks faced by any one agent depend not only on its choices but also on those of all others. Expectations about others' choices will influence investments in risk-management, and the outcome can be sub-optimal investment all round. We model this as the Nash equilibrium of a game and give conditions for such a sub-optimal equilibrium to be tipped to an optimal one. We also characterize the smallest coalition to tip an equilibrium, the minimum critical coalition, and show that this is also the cheapest critical coalition, so that there is no less expensive way to move the system from the sub- optimal to the optimal equilibrium. We illustrate these results by reference to airline security, the control of infectious diseases via vaccination and investment in research and development.

Suggested Citation

  • Geoffrey Heal & Howard Kunreuther, 2004. "Interdependent Security: A General Model," NBER Working Papers 10706, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10706
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Bulow, Jeremy I & Geanakoplos, John D & Klemperer, Paul D, 1985. "Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 488-511, June.
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    4. Dasgupta, Partha & Stiglitz, Joseph, 1981. "Resource Depletion under Technological Uncertainty," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(1), pages 85-104, January.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Vicki Bier & Santiago Oliveros & Larry Samuelson, 2007. "Choosing What to Protect: Strategic Defensive Allocation against an Unknown Attacker," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(4), pages 563-587, August.
    2. Abhra Roy & Jomon Paul, 2013. "Terrorism deterrence in a two country framework: strategic interactions between R&D, defense and pre-emption," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 211(1), pages 399-432, December.
    3. Geoffrey Heal & Howard Kunreuther, 2005. "IDS Models of Airline Security," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 49(2), pages 201-217, April.
    4. Marco Pelliccia, 2020. "Decentralized Defence of a (Directed) Network Structure," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 31(6), pages 659-676, August.
    5. Radoslav Raykov, 2015. "Catastrophe insurance equilibrium with correlated claims," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 78(1), pages 89-115, January.
    6. Marcin Dziubinski & Sanjeev Goyal & Adrien Vigier, 2015. "Conflict and Networks," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1565, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    7. Bernhardt, Dan & Polborn, Mattias K., 2010. "Non-convexities and the gains from concealing defenses from committed terrorists," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 107(1), pages 52-54, April.
    8. Shafran, Aric P., 2008. "Risk externalities and the problem of wildfire risk," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 488-495, September.
    9. Dziubiński, Marcin Konrad & Goyal, Sanjeev, 2017. "How do you defend a network?," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(1), January.
    10. Hofmann, Annette, 2005. "Internalizing externalities of loss-prevention through insurance monopoly: An analysis of interdependent risks," Working Papers on Risk and Insurance 16, University of Hamburg, Institute for Risk and Insurance.
    11. Marcin Dziubinski & Sanjeev Goyal, 2014. "How to Defend a Network?," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1450, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    12. Corbet, Shaen & Gurdgiev, Constantin, 2019. "What the hack: Systematic risk contagion from cyber events," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 65(C).
    13. Vicki M. Bier, 2007. "Choosing What to Protect," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 27(3), pages 607-620, June.
    14. Annette Hofmann, 2007. "Internalizing externalities of loss prevention through insurance monopoly: an analysis of interdependent risks," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, Springer;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 32(1), pages 91-111, June.
    15. Wang, Zhen & Li, Chaofan & Jin, Xing & Ding, Hong & Cui, Guanghai & Yu, Lanping, 2021. "Evolutionary dynamics of the interdependent security games on complex network," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 399(C).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General

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