Cooperation in Polygamous Households. Experimental Evidence from Northern Benin

In the literature, polygamy is frequently associated with intra-household inefficiencies, commonly attributed to a lack of cooperation between co-wives. In this paper, we challenge this claim by investigating the extent to which co-wives are inclined to cooperate when mutual gains are at stake. Additionally,we examine whether the lack of voice in intra-household decision- making contributes to explaining commonly observed inefficiencies. Using public good games in northern Benin, we find that co-wives are not more prone to cooperate with their husband than with each other. Moreover,when they share mutual interests, they tend to coalesce and play against their husband’s interests. These findings are particularly strong in the case of women with low levels of agency. We argue that co-wives with low agency have more incentive to unite to collectively improve their access to household resources since, individually, they are marginalized. Finally,the comparison of monogamous and polygamous households reveals that efficiency levels and the determinants of cooperative behavior are similar in both types of households (at least when household members themselves set the rules regarding the allocation of the public good).