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Democracy, Redistribution, and Inequality: Evidence from the English Poor Law

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  • Jonathan Chapman

    (Division of Social Science)

Abstract

This paper tests whether inequality mediates the effect of democratization on government redistribution. An 1894 democratic reform to councils that provided social insurance in Britain is used as the treatment event in a difference-in-difference analysis. The reform removed institutional features- a graduated franchise, property qualifications, the absence of a secret ballot, and the participation of unelected magistrates- that helped landowners seize control of spending on poor relief after the 1832 Great Reform Act. The results support theories arguing that inequality strengthens elite opposition to democratization: more unequal districts experienced greater increases in government expenditure following the democratic reform.

Suggested Citation

  • Jonathan Chapman, 2020. "Democracy, Redistribution, and Inequality: Evidence from the English Poor Law," Working Papers 20200050, New York University Abu Dhabi, Department of Social Science, revised Jun 2020.
    • Handle: RePEc:nad:wpaper:20200050
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Eric Melander & Martina Miotto, 2023. "Welfare Cuts and Crime: Evidence from the New Poor Law," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 133(651), pages 1248-1264.
    2. Andrea Marcucci & Dominic Rohner & Alessandro Saia, 2023. "Ballot or Bullet: The Impact of the UK’s Representation of the People Act on Peace and Prosperity," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 133(652), pages 1510-1536.
    3. Jan K. Brueckner, 2023. "Is strategic interaction among governments just a modern phenomenon? Evidence on welfare competition under Britain’s 19th-century Poor Law," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 30(4), pages 879-912, August.

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