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A new puzzle in the social evaluation of risk

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Abstract

We highlight a new paradox for the social evaluation of risk that bears on the evaluation of individual well-being rather than social welfare, but has serious implications for social evaluation. The paradox consists in a tension between rationality, respect for individual preferences, and a principle of informational parsimony that excludes individual risk attitudes from the assessment of riskless situations. No social evaluation criteria can satisfy these three principles. This impossibility result has implications for the evaluation of social welfare under risk, especially when the preferences of some individuals are not known. It generalizes existing impossibility results, while relying on very weak principles of social rationality and respect for individual preferences. We explore the possibilities opened by weakening one of our three principles and discuss the advantages and drawbacks of these different routes

Suggested Citation

  • Marc Fleurbaey & Stéphane Zuber, 2020. "A new puzzle in the social evaluation of risk," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 20028, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
  • Handle: RePEc:mse:cesdoc:20028
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Adler, Matthew D. & Treich, Nicolas, 2017. "Utilitarianism, prioritarianism, and intergenerational equity: A cake eating model," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 94-102.
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    Cited by:

    1. Balter, Anne G. & Schweizer, Nikolaus, 2024. "Robust decisions for heterogeneous agents via certainty equivalents," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 317(1), pages 171-184.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    social welfare; risk; social rationality; Pareto; fairness;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

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