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Pushing the Tipping in International Environmental Agreements

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Abstract

This paper intends to provide an alternative approach to the formation of International Environmental Agreements (IEA). The existing consensus within the literature is that there are either too few signatories or that the emissions of signatories are almost the same as business as usual (BAU). I start from a well-known model (Barrett 1997), adding heterogeneity in countries' marginal abatement costs (low and high) and in damages suffered (or corresponding environmental concern). I also allow for technological transfers and border taxes. I show that using either mechanism one at a time, does not change the results. But if both are used in a strategic manner, a grand (and abating) coalition can be reached, while minimizing transfers

Suggested Citation

  • Lorenzo Cerda Planas, 2015. "Pushing the Tipping in International Environmental Agreements," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 15031, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    • Handle: RePEc:mse:cesdoc:15031
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Eichner, Thomas & Pethig, Rüdiger, 2013. "Self-enforcing environmental agreements and international trade," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 37-50.
    2. Effrosyni Diamantoudi & Eftichios S. Sartzetakis, 2006. "Stable International Environmental Agreements: An Analytical Approach," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 8(2), pages 247-263, May.
    3. Barrett, Scott, 1994. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 878-894, Supplemen.
    4. Michael Hoel & Kerstin Schneider, 1997. "Incentives to participate in an international environmental agreement," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 9(2), pages 153-170, March.
    5. Geoffrey Heal & Howard Kunreuther, 2011. "Tipping Climate Negotiations," NBER Working Papers 16954, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1993. "Strategies for the international protection of the environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 309-328, October.
    7. Barrett, Scott, 2001. "International cooperation for sale," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(10), pages 1835-1850, December.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Self-enforcing environmental agreements; border tax; tipping;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
    • C63 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Computational Techniques
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • F18 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade and Environment
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
    • O32 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D

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