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The three worlds of welfare capitalism revisited

Author

Listed:
  • Sarah Brockhoff

    (Bielefed University and University of Freiburg)

  • Stéphane Rossignol

    (LED - Université Paris 8)

  • Emmanuelle Taugourdeau

    (Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne)

Abstract

We introduce a new way to model the Bismarckian social insuance system, stressing its corporatist dimension. Comparing the Beveridgean, Bismarckian and Liberal systems according to the majority voting rule, we show that for a given distribution of risks inside society, the Liberal system wins if the inequality of income is low, and the Beveridgean system wins if the inequality of income is high. Using a utilitarian criterion, the Beveridgean system always dominates and the Bismarckian system is preferred to the Liberal one

Suggested Citation

  • Sarah Brockhoff & Stéphane Rossignol & Emmanuelle Taugourdeau, 2012. "The three worlds of welfare capitalism revisited," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 12018, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
  • Handle: RePEc:mse:cesdoc:12018
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    File URL: http://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/CES2012/12018.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Baptiste Françon & Michaël Zemmour, 2013. "What shapes the generosity of short- and long-term benefits? A political economy approach," Post-Print halshs-00821083, HAL.
    2. Baptiste Françon & Michaël Zemmour, 2013. "What shapes the generosity of short- and long-term benefits? A political economy approach," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 13027, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Social insurance systems; political economy; Bismarck; Beveridge; inequality; redistributions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H53 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs

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