Taille de pays et stratégie de concurrence fiscale des petits pays
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
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Other versions of this item:
- Nicolas Chatelais, 2011. "Taille de pays et stratégie de concurrence fiscale des petits pays," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00654388, HAL.
- Nicolas Chatelais, 2011. "Taille de pays et stratégie de concurrence fiscale des petits pays," Post-Print halshs-00654388, HAL.
Citations
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Cited by:
- Paloma Péligry & Xavier Ragot, 2022.
"Evolution of fiscal systems: Convergence or divergence?,"
Working Papers
hal-03554224, HAL.
- Paloma Péligry & Xavier Ragot, 2022. "Evolution of fiscal systems: Convergence or divergence?," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03554224, HAL.
- Paloma Péligry & Xavier Ragot, 2022.
"Evolution of fiscal systems: Convergence or divergence?,"
Working Papers
hal-03554224, HAL.
- Paloma Péligry & Xavier Ragot, 2022. "Evolution of fiscal systems: Convergence or divergence?," SciencePo Working papers hal-03554224, HAL.
More about this item
Keywords
Country size; free-riding; non-cooperative behaviors; European Union; small countries;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- E02 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General - - - Institutions and the Macroeconomy
- E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
- F2 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business
- H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General
- H32 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Firm
- H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-EEC-2012-01-03 (European Economics)
- NEP-MAC-2012-01-03 (Macroeconomics)
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