IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/mpg/wpaper/2017_03.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Carving out legacy assets: a successful tool for bank restructuring?

Author

Listed:
  • Martin Hellwig

    (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods)

Abstract

Beginning with the proposal by Enria (2017), the paper discusses the scope for successful bank restructuring through a carveout of impaired assets and a transfer of these assets to a government-sponsored asset management company. The paper argues that the success of such an operation requires a use of public funds, either outright or through contingent commitments. Clawback provisions are problematic because they create contingent liabilities that merely shift risks from the assets side to the liabilities sides of banks’ balance sheets. The paper distinguishes between asset impairments coming from considerations of prospective returns and asset impairments coming from frictions in the markets in which these assets are traded. It also distinguishes between threats to bank solvency and threats to bank funding/liquidity. In each case, the success of bank restructuring from asset carveouts depends on the extent to which threats to the bank’s solvency is eliminated. If these threats concern bank funding and asset liquidations at depressed prices, public funds may eventually not be needed. If threats to bank solvency come from nonperforming loans, taxpayer support may be essential. The notion of “real economic value” as the price at which assets should be transferred is problematic and leaves ample room for hidden subsidies. The success of restructuring of the individual bank may itself come at a risk to financial stability as the preservation of existing capacities maintains competitive pressure and depresses bank profitability. Additional risks may come from the burden on the government’s fiscal stance.

Suggested Citation

  • Martin Hellwig, 2017. "Carving out legacy assets: a successful tool for bank restructuring?," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2017_03, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
  • Handle: RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2017_03
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2017_03online.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mark Hallerberg & Christopher Gandrud, 2014. "Bad banks in the EU- the impact of Eurostat rules," Bruegel Working Papers 864, Bruegel.
    2. Anat R. Admati & Peter M. Demarzo & Martin F. Hellwig & Paul Pfleiderer, 2018. "The Leverage Ratchet Effect," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 73(1), pages 145-198, February.
    3. Martin Hellwig, 2009. "Systemic Risk in the Financial Sector: An Analysis of the Subprime-Mortgage Financial Crisis," De Economist, Springer, vol. 157(2), pages 129-207, June.
    4. Stephanie Medina Cas & Irena Peresa, 2016. "What Makes a Good "Bad Bank"? The Irish, Spanish and German Experience," European Economy - Discussion Papers 036, Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission.
    5. Martin F. Hellwig, 2014. "Yes Virginia, There is a European Banking Union! But It May Not Make Your Wishes Come True," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2014_12, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    6. Martin Hellwig, 2015. "Neoliberales Sektierertum oder Wissenschaft? Zum Verhältnis von Grundlagenforschung und Politikanwendung in der Ökonomie," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2015_17, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    7. Englund, Peter, 1999. "The Swedish Banking Crisis: Roots and Consequences," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 15(3), pages 80-97, Autumn.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Martin F. Hellwig, 2018. "Valuation reports in the context of banking resolution: What are the challenges?," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2018_06, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    2. Segura, Anatoli & Suarez, Javier, 2023. "Bank restructuring under asymmetric information: The role of bad loan sales," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 56(C).
    3. Claudia M. Buch & Benjamin Weigert, 2019. "Macroprudential policy in a currency union," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 155(1), pages 23-33, February.
    4. Festić Mejra, 2019. "International Environment: Recovery and Resolution Regimes as the Pillar of the Banking Union," Naše gospodarstvo/Our economy, Sciendo, vol. 65(2), pages 30-40, June.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Gehrig, Thomas & Iannino, Maria Chiara, 2021. "Did the Basel Process of capital regulation enhance the resiliency of European banks?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 55(C).
    2. Gunther Tichy, 2010. "War die Finanzkrise vorhersehbar?," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 11(4), pages 356-382, November.
    3. Martin Hellwig, 2019. "Target-Falle oder Empörungsfalle? – Zur deutschen Diskussion um die Europäische Währungsunion," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2019_05, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    4. Martin Hellwig, 2017. "Precautionary recapitalisations: time for a review," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2017_14, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    5. repec:zbw:bofrdp:2018_016 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Bofinger, Peter & Schnabel, Isabel & Feld, Lars P. & Schmidt, Christoph M. & Wieland, Volker, 2014. "Mehr Vertrauen in Marktprozesse. Jahresgutachten 2014/15 [More confidence in market processes. Annual Report 2014/15]," Annual Economic Reports / Jahresgutachten, German Council of Economic Experts / Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, volume 127, number 201415, September.
    7. Michiel Bijlsma & Wim Suyker, 2008. "The credit crisis and the Dutch economy... in eight frequently asked questions," CPB Memorandum 210.rdf, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    8. Konstantin A. Kholodilin & Sebastian Kohl & Florian Müller, 2023. "Government-Made House Price Bubbles? Austerity, Homeownership, Rental, and Credit Liberalization Policies and the “Irrational Exuberance” on Housing Markets," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 2061, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    9. Michiel Bijlsma & Jeroen Klomp & Sijmen Duineveld, 2010. "Systemic risk in the financial sector; a review and synthesis," CPB Document 210.rdf, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
    10. Gehrig, Thomas & Iannino, Maria Chiara, 2021. "Did the Basel Process of capital regulation enhance the resiliency of European banks?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 55(C).
    11. Anat R. Admati & Peter M. DeMarzo & Martin F. Hellwig & Paul Pfleiderer, 2013. "Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity is Not Socially Expensive," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2013_23, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    12. Kox, Henk L.M. & Leeuwen, George van, 2012. "Dynamic market selection in EU business services," MPRA Paper 41016, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    13. Martin Hellwig, 2016. "“Total Assets” versus “Risk Weighted Assets”: Does it matter for MREL requirements?," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2016_12, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    14. Crowe, Christopher & Dell’Ariccia, Giovanni & Igan, Deniz & Rabanal, Pau, 2013. "How to deal with real estate booms: Lessons from country experiences," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 300-319.
    15. Feldmann, Horst, 2012. "Banking deregulation around the world, 1970s to 2000s: The impact on unemployment," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 26-42.
    16. Gründl, Helmut & Post, Thomas, 2009. "Transparency through financial claims with fingerprints: A free market mechanism for preventing mortgage securitization induced financial crises," SFB 649 Discussion Papers 2009-018, Humboldt University Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk.
    17. Önundur Páll Ragnarsson & Jón Magnús Hannesson & Loftur Hreinsson, 2019. "Financial cycles as early warning indicators - Lessons from the Nordic region," Economics wp80, Department of Economics, Central bank of Iceland.
    18. Wenlian Gao & Feifei Zhu & Kai Chen, 2023. "The role of bank lenders in firm leverage adjustments," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 46(1), pages 63-97, February.
    19. Vladimir Asriyan & Victoria Vanasco, 2019. "Security design in non-exclusive markets with asymmetric information," Economics Working Papers 1712, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jun 2021.
    20. Markus Behn & Rainer Haselmann & Paul Wachtel, 2016. "Procyclical Capital Regulation and Lending," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 71(2), pages 919-956, April.
    21. Guillermo Calvo & Fabrizio Coricelli & Pablo Ottonello, 2014. "Jobless Recoveries during Financial Crises: Is Inflation the Way Out?," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series, in: Sofía Bauducco & Lawrence Christiano & Claudio Raddatz (ed.),Macroeconomic and Financial Stability: challenges for Monetary Policy, edition 1, volume 19, chapter 11, pages 331-381, Central Bank of Chile.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mpg:wpaper:2017_03. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Marc Martin (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/mppggde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.