IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/mos/moswps/2010-52.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The efficiency of government promotion of the tourism industry

Author

Listed:
  • Hui Shi

Abstract

As promotion of tourism changes preferences, and hence the utility function, the usual comparative static analysis is not appropriate. A comparison of utility levels with, and without, promotion has to be conducted with the same utility function. The choice of the utility function depends on whether the promotion provides any utilityenhancing information or simply induces consumption switching (from non-tourism goods to tourism goods). With a series of simulations, it is shown that in the case of information enhancement, tax funded promotion of tourism may be efficient. In addition, it may also overcome the inefficiency associated with imperfect competition if the tourism industry produces under a higher degree of increasing returns than the non-tourism industry. If the reverse is true, and in the absence of information enhancement, promotion of tourism will reduce social welfare in accordance to the original preference.

Suggested Citation

  • Hui Shi, 2010. "The efficiency of government promotion of the tourism industry," Monash Economics Working Papers 52-10, Monash University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:mos:moswps:2010-52
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.buseco.monash.edu.au/eco/research/papers/2010/5210efficiencyshi.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Hui Shi & Russell Smyth, 2012. "Economies of scale in the Australian tourism industry," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 44(33), pages 4355-4367, November.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    preference; increasing returns; promotion;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D50 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - General
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mos:moswps:2010-52. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Simon Angus (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/dxmonau.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.