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Borda Count Method for Fiscal Policy- A Political Economic Analysis -

Author

Listed:
  • Ryo Ishida

    (Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance)

  • Kazumasa Oguro

    (Faculty of Economics, Hosei University)

Abstract

Survey data reveals that government budgets tend to go into the red. Public Choice economists as well as public finance economists have been interested in this phenomenon. This paper presents a new explanation for this tendency from the political economic point of view; the current voting system might have a tendency to bring about a budget deficit. If policy choices only deal with the current tax rate and do not take into account the intertemporal tax rate, budget-balanced choice is difficult to be chosen. Even if voting choices take into account intertemporal aspects, we show that a budget-balanced choice is difficult to be chosen under relative majority rule. We further demonstrate that the Borda count method might overcome this issue.

Suggested Citation

  • Ryo Ishida & Kazumasa Oguro, 2017. "Borda Count Method for Fiscal Policy- A Political Economic Analysis -," Discussion papers ron294, Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance Japan.
    • Handle: RePEc:mof:wpaper:ron294
    as

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    File URL: https://www.mof.go.jp/pri/research/discussion_paper/ron294.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2016
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    Cited by:

    1. Toshiaki Hiromitsu & Yoko Kitakaji & Keishiro Hara & Tatsuyoshi Saijo, 2021. "What Do People Say When They Become “Future People”?―Positioning Imaginary Future Generations (IFGs) in General Rules for Good Decision-Making," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(12), pages 1-27, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    relative majority rule; Borda count method; deficit;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • H62 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Deficit; Surplus

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