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Network formation and coordination games

Author

Listed:
  • Berninghaus, Siegfried
  • Vogt, Bodo

Abstract

A population of players is considered in which each player may select his neighbors in order to play a 2x2 coordination game with each of them. We analyze how the payoffs in the underlying coordination game effect the resulting equilibrium neighborhood resp. network structure. Depending on the size of the communication costs the resulting equilibrium networks may be characterized by bipartite graphs if the coordination game is of the Hawk/Dove type while networks show a tendency to build complete or disconnected graphs if neighbors play a pure coordination game.

Suggested Citation

  • Berninghaus, Siegfried & Vogt, Bodo, 2003. "Network formation and coordination games," Papers 03-16, Sonderforschungsbreich 504.
    • Handle: RePEc:mnh:spaper:2769
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    File URL: https://madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/2769/1/dp03_16.pdf
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Siegfried Berninghaus & Karl-Martin Ehrhart & Marion Ott & Bodo Vogt, 2007. "Evolution of networks—an experimental analysis," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 317-347, June.
    2. Milena Tsvetkova & Vincent Buskens, 2013. "Coordination On Egalitarian Networks From Asymmetric Relations In A Social Game Of Chicken," Advances in Complex Systems (ACS), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 16(01), pages 1-16.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Coordination games ; network formation ; local interaction ; equilibrium selection;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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