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Multiproject Team Assignments

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Listed:
  • Sherstyuk, K

Abstract

We consider expected profit maximizing mechanisms for a principal who has to allocate a group of agents among a number of projets, assuming that the principal has incomplete information about each agent's ability type, and the agents follow the Bayes-Nash or the dominant strategy equilibrium behavior. We find that while expected profit maximizing mechanisms ar similare to the optimal auction, the incentive compatibility constraints are much more restrictive. Interestingly, these constraints are satisfied if each agent's characteristics change in a consistent manner not only with types, but also from project to project.

Suggested Citation

  • Sherstyuk, K, 1997. "Multiproject Team Assignments," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 559, The University of Melbourne.
    • Handle: RePEc:mlb:wpaper:559
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    Keywords

    STATISTICS; GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM; PROJECT MANAGEMENT;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

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