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How Does the Government (Want to) Fund Science? Politics, Lobbying and Academic Earmarks

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  • de Figueiredo, John
  • Silverman, Brian

Abstract

This paper examines academic earmarks and its role in the funding of university research. It provides a summary and review of the evidence on the supply of earmarks by legislators. It then discusses the role of university lobbying for earmarks on the demand side. After a review of the literature of the impact of earmarks on research quantity and quality, the paper poses a number of public policy questions related to the funding of science.

Suggested Citation

  • de Figueiredo, John & Silverman, Brian, 2004. "How Does the Government (Want to) Fund Science? Politics, Lobbying and Academic Earmarks," Working papers 4484-04, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:mit:sloanp:7404
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/7404
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. A Abigail Payne, 2002. "Do US Congressional earmarks increase research output at universities?," Science and Public Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 29(5), pages 314-330, October.
    2. La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert, 1999. "The Quality of Government," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(1), pages 222-279, April.
    3. Kevin M. Murphy & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 2008. "Why Is Rent-Seeking So Costly to Growth?," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Kai A. Konrad & Arye L. Hillman (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2, pages 213-218, Springer.
    4. Hall, Richard L. & Grofman, Bernard, 1990. "The Committee Assignment Process and the Conditional Nature of Committee Bias," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 84(4), pages 1149-1166, December.
    5. R. Arnold, 1981. "Legislators, bureaucrats, and locational decisions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 107-132, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kok, Holmer & Faems, Dries & de Faria, Pedro, 2022. "Pork Barrel or Barrel of Gold? Examining the performance implications of earmarking in public R&D grants," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 51(7).
    2. Gerald A. Carlino & Robert M. Hunt, 2009. "What explains the quantity and quality of local inventive activity?," Working Papers 09-12, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    3. Paula Stephan, 2014. "The Endless Frontier: Reaping What Bush Sowed?," NBER Chapters, in: The Changing Frontier: Rethinking Science and Innovation Policy, pages 321-366, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Eli Dourado & Alex Tabarrok, 2015. "Public choice perspectives on intellectual property," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 163(1), pages 129-151, April.
    5. de Figueiredo, John M & Silverman, Brian S, 2006. "Academic Earmarks and the Returns to Lobbying," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 49(2), pages 597-625, October.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Lobbying; Education; Political Economy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • O38 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Government Policy
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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