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Disclosing vs. withholding technology knowledge in a duopoly

Author

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  • Paolo Giorgio GARELLA
  • Emanuele BACCHIEGA

Abstract

We study firms' incentives to transfer knowledge about production technology to a rival in a Cournot duopoly. In a setting where two technologies are available, a technology is characterized by its associated cost function and no single technology is strictly superior to the other. A firm has superior information if it knows both techniques and the other only one. Cost efficiency may be "reversed" after the voluntary disclosure, so that the rival's costs are improved at the equilibrium level of output. Adding R&D investments to the picture, we find that a firm can decide to invest just for the purpose of acquiring knowledge that will be transferred and not used. Furthermore, for the same point in the parameters space, the acquisition of full knowledge may occur or not as a function of the initial distribution of information

Suggested Citation

  • Paolo Giorgio GARELLA & Emanuele BACCHIEGA, 2007. "Disclosing vs. withholding technology knowledge in a duopoly," Departmental Working Papers 2007-001, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
    • Handle: RePEc:mil:wpdepa:2007-001
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Oligopoly; Information disclosure; R&D Joint Ventures; R&D Consortia; Returns to scale;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • O30 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - General

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