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Models of Partnerships

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  • Paolo Balduzzi

    (Department of Economics, University of Milan-Bicocca and Edinburgh School of Economics)

Abstract

Beside the traditional public-private dichotomy for the provision of public services, an increasing attention has been devoted to the use of public-private partnerships (PPPs). This paper compares relative inefficiencies of public provision, traditional private provision and PPPs. It also analyses the e?ect of workers’ efforts and incentives on the success of this new device.

Suggested Citation

  • Paolo Balduzzi, 2006. "Models of Partnerships," Working Papers 96, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised May 2006.
    • Handle: RePEc:mib:wpaper:96
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    File URL: http://repec.dems.unimib.it/repec/pdf/mibwpaper96.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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