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Max-Max Group Contests with Incomplete Information à la Global Games

Author

Listed:
  • Davide Bosco
  • Mario Gilli
  • Andrea Sorrentino

Abstract

In this paper we introduce incomplete information `a la global games into a deterministic two-group contest with the best-shot impact function and binary actions and we characterize the set of equilibria. Depending on whether the complete information assumption is relaxed on the value of the prize or on the cost of providing effort, we obtain different results in terms of equilibrium uniqueness: in the first case, there exist an equilibrium in (monotonic) switching strategies which could be not unique, whereas in the second one there exists a unique equilibrium in (monotonic) switching-strategies. Then, we discuss the presence of the group-size paradox for both classes of games.The results are thus extended to the case of M groups, and the properties of Bayes-Nash equilibria for these classes of games are investigated. Finally, we show a limit-uniqueness and a noise independent selection result.

Suggested Citation

  • Davide Bosco & Mario Gilli & Andrea Sorrentino, 2025. "Max-Max Group Contests with Incomplete Information à la Global Games," Working Papers 548, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:mib:wpaper:548
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Group contests; incomplete information; global games.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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