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Intention-based Social Influence in Sharing Experiments

Author

Listed:
  • Daniela Di Cagno

    (LUISS Guido Carli, Rome)

  • Werner Güth

    (Luiss Guido Carli, Rome; Frankfurt School of Finance and Management, Frankfurt; Max Planck Institute on Collective Goods, Bonn)

  • Marcello Puca
  • Patrizia Sbriglia

Abstract

We experimentally study intention-based social influence from other group members on proposers and recipients in standard and modified Ultimatum and Impunity games. Standard games allow for bi-dimensional strategy vectors whereas they are uni-dimensional in modified games. The latter reveal more clearly intended fairness that should strengthen others’ influence. Groups are minimally identified by colors and social influence is based on information about median intention(s) in one’s group. Social influence affects bi-dimensional Ultimatum bargaining significantly more than Impunity generosity suggesting that the latter is more immune to social influence, i.e. sharing triggered by intrinsic generosity concerns is less sensitive than sharing, confounded by strategic concerns. Altogether, social influence enhances conformity seeking and thereby efficiency, but its effect is strongly role dependent.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniela Di Cagno & Werner Güth & Marcello Puca & Patrizia Sbriglia, 2018. "Intention-based Social Influence in Sharing Experiments," Working Papers CESARE 2/2018, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza, LUISS Guido Carli.
  • Handle: RePEc:lui:cesare:1802
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    File URL: http://economiaefinanza.luiss.it/sites/economiaefinanza.luiss.it/files/1802.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Clelia Mazzoni & Patrizia Sbriglia, 2022. "An Experimental Investigation of Trusting Behaviour," Games, MDPI, vol. 13(6), pages 1-11, November.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Ultimatum Game; Impunity Game; Social Influence; Group Identity; Fairness; Experiments;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior

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