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On tax competition, international migration, and occupational choice

Author

Listed:
  • Yutao Han

    (University of International Business and Economics, Beijing, CH)

  • Patrice Pieretti

    (Department of Economics and Management, Université du Luxembourg)

Abstract

(To consult this DP, please send an e-mail to dem@uni.lu) The aim of the paper is to analyze tax competition with inter- nationally mobile individuals who make occupational choices. Two types of migration are distinguished, namely entrepreneur and worker migration. When the competing jurisdictions put a sufficiently high valuation on public good expenditures, entrepreneurship migration increases joint welfare relative to autarky. However, in case of labor migration, tax competition can decrease joint welfare independently of how much the jurisdictions value public expenditures.

Suggested Citation

  • Yutao Han & Patrice Pieretti, 2020. "On tax competition, international migration, and occupational choice," DEM Discussion Paper Series 20-07, Department of Economics at the University of Luxembourg.
    • Handle: RePEc:luc:wpaper:20-07
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    4. Wim Naudé & Melissa Siegel & Katrin Marchand, 2017. "Migration, entrepreneurship and development: critical questions," IZA Journal of Migration and Development, Springer;Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH (IZA), vol. 6(1), pages 1-16, December.
    5. Jean Gabszewicz & Ornella Tarola & Skerdilajda Zanaj, 2016. "Migration, wages and income taxes," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 23(3), pages 434-453, June.
    6. Kanbur, Ravi & Keen, Michael, 1993. "Jeux Sans Frontieres: Tax Competition and Tax Coordination When Countries Differ in Size," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 877-892, September.
    7. Marthen L. Ndoen & Piet Rietveld & (*), Peter Nijkamp & Kees Gorter, 2002. "Entrepreneurial migration and regional opportunities in developing countries," The Annals of Regional Science, Springer;Western Regional Science Association, vol. 36(3), pages 421-436.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    migration; tax competition; occupational choice; social Welfare.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F22 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Migration
    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
    • H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • J61 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Geographic Labor Mobility; Immigrant Workers

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