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Differential Games with (A)symmetric Players and Heterogeneous Strategies

Author

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  • Benteng Zou

    (CREA, Université de Luxembourg)

Abstract

One family of heterogeneous strategies in differential games with (a)symmetric players is developed in which one player adopts an anticipating open-loop strategy and the other adopts a standard Markovian strategy. Via conjecturing principle, the anticipating open-loop strategic player plans her strategy based on the possible updating the rival player may take. These asymmetric strategies frame nondegenerate Markovian Nash Equilibrium, which could be subgame perfect for autonomous system with infinite time horizon. Except the stationary path, this kind of strategy makes the study of short-run trajectory possible, which usually are not subgame perfect. However, the short-run non-perfection provides very important policy suggestions. Differential game, Heterogeneous strategy, subgame perfect Markovian Nash Equilibrium, anticipating open-loop strategy

Suggested Citation

  • Benteng Zou, 2015. "Differential Games with (A)symmetric Players and Heterogeneous Strategies," DEM Discussion Paper Series 15-06, Department of Economics at the University of Luxembourg.
    • Handle: RePEc:luc:wpaper:15-06
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    File URL: https://wwwen-archive.uni.lu/content/download/80878/1000989/file/2015_06%20Differential%20Games%20with%20(A)symmetric%20Players%20and%20Heterogeneous%20Strategies.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Raouf Boucekkine & Carmen Camacho & Weihua Ruan & Benteng Zou, 2022. "Optimal coalition splitting with heterogenous strategies," PSE Working Papers halshs-03770401, HAL.
    2. Guillaume Bataille & Benteng Zou, 2024. "International Fisheries Agreements: Endogenous Exits, Shapley Values, and Moratorium Fishing Policy," DEM Discussion Paper Series 24-06, Department of Economics at the University of Luxembourg.
    3. Guillaume Bataille & Benteng Zou, 2024. "International Fisheries Agreements: Endogenous Exits, Shapley Values, and Moratorium Fishing Policy," AMSE Working Papers 2421, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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