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Tying in International Trade

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  • Marin, Dalia

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  • Marin, Dalia, 1990. "Tying in International Trade," Munich Reprints in Economics 3114, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:lmu:muenar:3114
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gene M. Grossman & Henrik Horn, 1988. "Infant-Industry Protection Reconsidered: The Case of Informational Barriers to Entry," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 103(4), pages 767-787.
    2. Crawford, Vincent P, 1988. "Long-term Relationships Governed by Short-term Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(3), pages 485-499, June.
    3. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, December.
    4. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
    5. David Greenaway, 1990. "Trade Related Investment Measures: Political Economy Aspects and Issues for GATT," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(3), pages 367-385, September.
    6. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1974. "Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 41(2), pages 219-255.
    7. Wolfgang Mayer, 1984. "The Infant-Export Industry Argument," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 17(2), pages 249-269, May.
    8. Rey, Patrick & Salanie, Bernard, 1990. "Long-term, Short-term and Renegotiation: On the Value of Commitment in Contracting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(3), pages 597-619, May.
    9. Klein, Benjamin & Crawford, Robert G & Alchian, Armen A, 1978. "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 297-326, October.
    10. Gary Banks, 1983. "The Economics and Politics of Countertrade," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(2), pages 159-182, June.
    11. Williamson, Oliver E, 1983. "Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 519-540, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Caves, Richard E & Marin, Dalia, 1992. "Countertrade Transactions: Theory and Evidence," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 102(414), pages 1171-1183, September.
    2. Dalia Marin & Monika Schnitzer, 1998. "Economic incentives and international trade," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 705-716, May.
    3. Dalia Marin & Monika Schnitzer, 2002. "The Economic Institution Of International Barter," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(479), pages 293-316, April.
    4. Jacek Prokop & Ewa Baranowska-Prokop, 2006. "Asymetria informacji a transakcje wiązane," Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, issue 7-8, pages 9-25.
    5. Amann, Erwin & Marin, Dalia, 1994. "Risk-Sharing in International Trade," Munich Reprints in Economics 3110, University of Munich, Department of Economics.

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