IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/leo/wpaper/1036.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Le problème d'agence dans la délégation de gestion de portefeuille : une revue de la littérature

Author

Listed:
  • Raphaëlle BELLANDO

Abstract

This paper surveys the literature on the agency problem in portfolio management delegation. The fact that there is no optimal contract in this case is well-documented. More recent papers have shown that this problem can be solved by adding to the contract some management constraints. However some empirical studies about implicit incentives demonstrate the convexity of the manager's compensation, due to an asymmetric relation between flow of funds and the past performances of the fund. Finally, we review empirical work about two important consequences of this agency problem: excessive risk taking and herding.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Raphaëlle BELLANDO, 2006. "Le problème d'agence dans la délégation de gestion de portefeuille : une revue de la littérature," LEO Working Papers / DR LEO 1036, Orleans Economics Laboratory / Laboratoire d'Economie d'Orleans (LEO), University of Orleans.
    • Handle: RePEc:leo:wpaper:1036
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://data.leo-univ-orleans.fr/media/search-works/1036/WP_2540.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Raphaëlle Bellando & Sébastien Ringuedé, 2007. "Compétition entre fonds et prise de risque excessive : une application empirique au cas des OPCVM actions de droit français," Post-Print halshs-00226341, HAL.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:leo:wpaper:1036. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sébastien Galanti (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/leorlfr.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.