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The strategy method conflates confusion with conditional cooperation in public goods games: evidence from large scale replications

Author

Listed:
  • Maxwell N. Burton-Chellew
  • Victoire D'Amico
  • Claire Guerin

Abstract

The strategy method is often used in public goods games to measure individuals’ willingness to cooperate depending on the level of cooperation by others (conditional cooperation). However, while the strategy method is informative, it risks being suggestive and inducing elevated levels of conditional cooperation that are not motivated by concerns for fairness, especially in uncertain or confused participants. Here we make 845 participants complete the strategy method two times, once with human and once with computerized groupmates. Cooperation with computers cannot rationally be motivated by concerns for fairness. Worryingly, 69% of participants conditionally cooperated with computers, whereas only 7% conditionally cooperated with humans while not cooperating with computers. Overall, 83% of participants cooperated with computers, contributing 89% as much as towards humans. Results from games with computers present a serious problem for measuring social behaviors.

Suggested Citation

  • Maxwell N. Burton-Chellew & Victoire D'Amico & Claire Guerin, 2021. "The strategy method conflates confusion with conditional cooperation in public goods games: evidence from large scale replications," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'économie 21.18, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, Département d’économie.
    • Handle: RePEc:lau:crdeep:21.18
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    Cited by:

    1. Burton-Chellew, Maxwell & West, Stuart, 2022. "The black box as a control for payoff-based learning in economic games," SocArXiv 5k4ez, Center for Open Science.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Confusion; fairness; inequity-aversion; strong reciprocity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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