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Further Reasons for the “But for†Defense of a Grant-Back Clause and the Attribute of Innovation

Author

Listed:
  • Masahito Ambashi

    (Institute of Economic Research, Kyoto University)

Abstract

This study investigates the effect of grant-back clauses in licensing agreements using a different analytical manner from that of Ambashi, Régibeau, and Rockett (2019) (abbreviated by “ARR†). Both this study and theirs focus on attributes of innovations categorized as either “severable†(noninfringing) or “nonseverable†(infringing). The European Commission’s 2004 Technology Transfer Guidelines consider a grant-back clause applied to nonseverable innovation innocuous. In contrast, those guidelines indicate that a grant-back clause that applies to severable innovation should be treated with much greater skepticism. However, this study reveals that this guidance requires further debate concerning prohibitions on territorial restraints and multiple heterogeneous licensees, as well as other factors noted in the work of ARR.

Suggested Citation

  • Masahito Ambashi, 2022. "Further Reasons for the “But for†Defense of a Grant-Back Clause and the Attribute of Innovation," KIER Working Papers 1073, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:kyo:wpaper:1073
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Suzanne Scotchmer, 1996. "Protecting Early Innovators: Should Second-Generation Products Be Patentable?," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(2), pages 322-331, Summer.
    2. Maria Pluvia Zuniga & Dominique Guellec, 2009. "Who Licenses out Patents and Why?: Lessons from a Business Survey," OECD Science, Technology and Industry Working Papers 2009/5, OECD Publishing.
    3. Suzanne Scotchmer, 1991. "Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 29-41, Winter.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Grant-back clause; Patent; Licensing; Severable and nonseverable innovation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
    • O34 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital

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