IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/kud/kuiedp/0219.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Finding a Nash Equilibrium in Spatial Games is an NP-Complete Problem

Author

Listed:
  • Richard Baron

    (CREUSET, University of Saint-Etienne)

  • Jaçques Durieu

    (CREUSET, University of Saint-Etienne)

  • Hans Haller

    (Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University)

  • Philippe Solal

    (CREUSET, University of Saint-Etienne)

Abstract

We consider the class of (finite) spatial games. We show that the problem of determining whether there exists a Nash equilibrium in which each player has a payoff of at least k is NP-complete as a function of the number of players. When each player has two strategies and the base game is an anti-coordination game, the problem is decidable in polynomial time.

Suggested Citation

  • Richard Baron & Jaçques Durieu & Hans Haller & Philippe Solal, 2002. "Finding a Nash Equilibrium in Spatial Games is an NP-Complete Problem," Discussion Papers 02-19, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics, revised Nov 2002.
    • Handle: RePEc:kud:kuiedp:0219
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.econ.ku.dk/english/research/publications/wp/2002/0219.pdf/
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. R. S. Bartholo & C. A. Cosenza & F. A. Doria & M. Doria & A. Teixeira, 2011. "On Exact and Approximate Solutions for Hard Problems: An Alternative Look," ASSRU Discussion Papers 1103, ASSRU - Algorithmic Social Science Research Unit.
    2. Demuynck, Thomas, 2011. "The computational complexity of rationalizing boundedly rational choice behavior," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(4-5), pages 425-433.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    spatial games; NP-completeness; graph K-colorability;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kud:kuiedp:0219. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Thomas Hoffmann (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/okokudk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.