IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/kud/kuieci/1999-09.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Generating Efficiency: Economic and Environmental Regulation of Public and Private Electricity Generators in Spain

Author

Listed:
  • Pablo Arocena

    (Universidad Pública de Navarra)

  • Catherine Waddams Price

    (University of Warwick)

Abstract

Economic regulation of firms with market power has placed increasing emphasis on incentive-based regulation such as price caps. We focus on the effect of regulation as distinct from ownership, and identify the effect of two different regulatory schemes on both publicly and privately owned Spanish electricity generators. Publicly owned generators were more efficient under cost of service regulation; private (but not public) firms responded to incentive regulation by increasing efficiency, bringing their productivity to similar levels. We introduce some novelty in modelling efficiency, including three pollutants and declared plant availability as outputs, and we test for the effect of environmental regulation in reducing pollutants

Suggested Citation

  • Pablo Arocena & Catherine Waddams Price, 1999. "Generating Efficiency: Economic and Environmental Regulation of Public and Private Electricity Generators in Spain," CIE Discussion Papers 1999-09, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:kud:kuieci:1999-09
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.econ.ku.dk/cie/dp/dp_1997-1999/1999-09.pdf/
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Forsund, Finn R & Hjalmarsson, Lennart, 1979. "Generalised Farrell Measures of Efficiency: An Application to Milk Processing in Swedish Dairy Plants," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 89(354), pages 294-315, June.
    2. Grifell-Tatje, E. & Lovell, C. A. K., 1997. "The sources of productivity change in Spanish banking," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 98(2), pages 364-380, April.
    3. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, April.
    4. De Fraja, Giovanni, 1993. "Productive efficiency in public and private firms," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 15-30, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Rolando Fuentes-Bracamontes, 2014. "Can electricity reform help Mexico achieve carbon emission reductions?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Policy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 3(3), pages 340-358, November.
    2. Mota, R.L., 2004. "‘Comparing Brazil and USA electricity performance; what was the impact of privatisation?’," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0423, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    3. Fare, Rolf & Grosskopf, Shawna & Zaim, Osman, 2002. "Hyperbolic efficiency and return to the dollar," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 136(3), pages 671-679, February.
    4. Gang Tian & Jian Shi & Licheng Sun & Xingle Long & Benhai Guo, 2017. "Dynamic changes in the energy–carbon performance of Chinese transportation sector: a meta-frontier non-radial directional distance function approach," Natural Hazards: Journal of the International Society for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Hazards, Springer;International Society for the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Hazards, vol. 89(2), pages 585-607, November.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Arocena, Pablo & Waddams Price, Catherine, 2002. "Generating efficiency: economic and environmental regulation of public and private electricity generators in Spain," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 41-69, January.
    2. Jamasb, T. & Mota, R. & Newbery, D. & Pollitt, M., 2004. "‘Electricity Sector Reform in Developing Countries: A Survey of Empirical Evidence on Determinants and Performance’," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0439, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    3. Laura Cabeza García & Silvia Gómez Ansón, 2012. "What Drives the Operating Performance of Privatised Firms?," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 59(1), pages 1-27, February.
    4. Miltiadis Makris, 2006. "Political authority, expertise and government bureaucracies," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 127(3), pages 267-284, June.
    5. Willner, Johan & Parker, David, 2002. "The Relative Performance of Public and Private Enterprise Under Conditions of Active and Passive Ownership," Centre on Regulation and Competition (CRC) Working papers 30591, University of Manchester, Institute for Development Policy and Management (IDPM).
    6. Osazee Frank Ogieva & Omorodion Omoregbe, 2017. "Measuring the Efficiency and Performance of Quoted Insurance Companies in Nigeria: Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) Approach," Annals of the University of Petrosani, Economics, University of Petrosani, Romania, vol. 17(1), pages 187-208.
    7. Warren Moskowitz & Stephen Yeaple, 1995. "The literature on privatization," Research Paper 9514, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    8. Choi, Kangsik, 2013. "Unionized Mixed Oligopoly and Privatization with Excess Burden of Taxation," MPRA Paper 51156, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Klein, Michael, 1996. "Competition in network industries," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1591, The World Bank.
    10. Rodrigo M. S. Moita & Claudio Paiva, 2013. "Political Price Cycles in Regulated Industries: Theory and Evidence," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 94-121, February.
    11. Johan Willner, 2003. "Privatisation and Public Ownership in Finland," CESifo Working Paper Series 1012, CESifo.
    12. MARINI, Marco, 1996. "Property Rights and Market : Employee Privatization as a Cooperative Bargaining Process," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1996023, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    13. Henrekson, Magnus & Johansson, Dan, 2010. "Firm Growth, Institutions and Structural Transformation," Ratio Working Papers 150, The Ratio Institute.
    14. Simon P. Anderson & Régis Renault, 2011. "Price Discrimination," Chapters, in: André de Palma & Robin Lindsey & Emile Quinet & Roger Vickerman (ed.), A Handbook of Transport Economics, chapter 22, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    15. Yuzhou Jiang & Ramteen Sioshansi, 2023. "What Duality Theory Tells Us About Giving Market Operators the Authority to Dispatch Energy Storage," The Energy Journal, , vol. 44(3), pages 89-110, May.
    16. Dionne, G. & Doherty, N., 1991. "Adverse Selection In Insurance Markets: A Selective Survey," Cahiers de recherche 9105, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
    17. Epure, Mircea & Kerstens, Kristiaan & Prior, Diego, 2011. "Technology-based total factor productivity and benchmarking: New proposals and an application," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 39(6), pages 608-619, December.
    18. David Martimort & Flavio Menezes & Myrna Wooders & ELISABETTA IOSSA & DAVID MARTIMORT, 2015. "The Simple Microeconomics of Public-Private Partnerships," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 17(1), pages 4-48, February.
    19. Jose Pastor & Lorenzo Serrano, 2006. "The Effect of Specialisation on Banks' Efficiency: An International Comparison," International Review of Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 20(1), pages 125-149.
    20. Bassanini, Anna & Pouyet, Jerome, 2005. "Strategic choice of financing systems in regulated and interconnected industries," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(2-3), pages 233-259, February.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    price cap regulation; total factor productivity; electricity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
    • D24 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Production; Cost; Capital; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity; Capacity

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kud:kuieci:1999-09. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Thomas Hoffmann (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ciekudk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.