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Does membership on the UN security council influence IMF decisions?

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Abstract

We investigate whether temporary members of the UN Security Council receive favorable treatment from the IMF, using panel data for 191 countries over the period 1951 to 2004. Our results indicate a robust positive relationship between temporary UN Security Council membership and participation in IMF programs, even after accounting for economic and political factors, as well as regional and country effects, and duration dependence. There is also evidence that UNSC membership reduces the number of conditions included in IMF programs. The size of the loan, however, is not affected by UNSC membership.

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  • Axel Dreher & Jan-Egbert Sturm & James Raymond Vreeland, 2006. "Does membership on the UN security council influence IMF decisions?," KOF Working papers 06-151, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich.
    • Handle: RePEc:kof:wpskof:06-151
    DOI: 10.3929/ethz-a-005277576
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    Cited by:

    1. Silvia Marchesi & Laura Sabani & Axel Dreher, 2009. "Agency and communicaton in IMF conditional lending: Theory and empirical evidence," KOF Working papers 09-218, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich.
    2. Dreher, Axel & Voigt, Stefan, 2011. "Does membership in international organizations increase governments' credibility? Testing the effects of delegating powers," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 326-348, September.
    3. Marchesi, Silvia & Sabani, Laura, 2007. "IMF concern for reputation and conditional lending failure: Theory and empirics," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 640-666, November.
    4. Yasemin Bal Gündüz, 2009. "Estimating Demand for IMF Financing by Low-Income Countries in Response to Shocks," IMF Working Papers 2009/263, International Monetary Fund.
    5. Mr. Christian Mumssen & Yasemin Bal Gündüz & Mr. Christian H Ebeke & Ms. Linda Kaltani, 2013. "IMF-Supported Programs in Low Income Countries: Economic Impact over the Short and Longer Term," IMF Working Papers 2013/273, International Monetary Fund.
    6. Alastair Smith, 2009. "Political Groups, Leader Change, and the Pattern of International Cooperation," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 53(6), pages 853-877, December.
    7. Matthew Hoddie & Caroline A. Hartzell, 2014. "Short-Term Pain, Long-Term Gain? The Effects of IMF Economic Reform Programs on Public Health Performance," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 95(4), pages 1022-1042, December.
    8. Dreher, Axel & Mölders, Florian & Nunnenkamp, Peter, 2007. "Are NGOs the better donors? A case study of aid allocation for Sweden," Kiel Working Papers 1383, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    9. Reynaud, Julien & Vauday, Julien, 2009. "Geopolitics and international organizations: An empirical study on IMF facilities," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 139-162, May.
    10. James Vreeland, 2006. "IMF program compliance: Aggregate index versus policy specific research strategies," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 1(4), pages 359-378, December.
    11. Bal Gündüz, Yasemin, 2016. "The Economic Impact of Short-term IMF Engagement in Low-Income Countries," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 30-49.
    12. Rainer Thiele & Peter Nunnenkamp & Axel Dreher, 2007. "Do Donors Target Aid in Line with the Millennium Development Goals? A Sector Perspective of Aid Allocation," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 143(4), pages 596-630, December.
    13. Reynaud, Julien & Vauday, Julien, 2008. "IMF lending and geopolitics," Working Paper Series 965, European Central Bank.
    14. Dreher, Axel & Sturm, Jan-Egbert & Vreeland, James Raymond, 2009. "Development aid and international politics: Does membership on the UN Security Council influence World Bank decisions?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 1-18, January.
    15. Silva Marchesi & Laura Sabani & Axel Dreher, 2009. "Agency and communication in IMF conditional lending: theory and empirical evidence," Ibero America Institute for Econ. Research (IAI) Discussion Papers 183, Ibero-America Institute for Economic Research.
    16. Dreher, Axel & Jensen, Nathan M, 2007. "Independent Actor or Agent? An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of U.S. Interests on International Monetary Fund Conditions," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 50(1), pages 105-124, February.
    17. Axel Dreher & Silvia Marchesi & James Vreeland, 2008. "The political economy of IMF forecasts," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 137(1), pages 145-171, October.
    18. Byungwon Woo, 2013. "Conditional on Conditionality: IMF Program Design and Foreign Direct Investment," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 39(3), pages 292-315, July.
    19. Axel Dreher & Silvia Marchesi & James Raymond Vreeland, 2007. "The Politics of IMF Forecasts," KOF Working papers 07-176, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich.

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    Keywords

    IMF; UN Security Council; Voting; Aid;
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