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Behold the 'Behemoth'. The privatization of Japan Post Bank

Author

Listed:
  • Uwe Vollmer

    (Economics Department, University of Leipzig, Germany)

  • Diemo Dietrich

    (Halle Institute for Economic Research, Germany)

  • Ralf bebenroth

    (Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration (RIEB), Kobe University, Japan)

Abstract

This paper analyzes the privatization process of the Japanese Post Bank (JPB), the largest bank in the world. We report some evidence in favour of the "political view" of SOB's and argue that, before privatization, postal savings banks served as vehicles for politicians to reallocate funds in exchange for private rents. We ask why politicians in Japan decided to privatize the postal savings system, predict how the privatization will proceed and study the expected results of the privatization process. We argue that there will be no level playing field in bank competition after the start of the privatization process and discuss possible out-comes of JPB privatization on financial stability in Japan.

Suggested Citation

  • Uwe Vollmer & Diemo Dietrich & Ralf bebenroth, 2009. "Behold the 'Behemoth'. The privatization of Japan Post Bank," Discussion Paper Series 236, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
    • Handle: RePEc:kob:dpaper:236
    as

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    File URL: https://www.rieb.kobe-u.ac.jp/academic/ra/dp/English/dp236.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2009
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Sawada, Michiru, 2013. "Measuring the effect of postal saving privatization on the Japanese banking industry: Evidence from the 2005 general election," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 967-983.
    2. Gary Robinson, 2017. "Pragmatic financialisation: the role of the Japanese Post Office," New Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(1), pages 61-75, January.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public banking; Japan; Privatization; Postal savings banks;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • L32 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Public Enterprises; Public-Private Enterprises
    • P12 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Enterprises

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