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The Economics and Politics of Administered Protection: An Analysis of the Japanese Safeguard System for Agricultural Goods

Author

Listed:
  • Koichi Kagitani

    (Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration (RIEB), Kobe University, Japan)

  • Hirofumi Tominaga

    (Graduate school of Economics, Kobe University, Japan)

  • Kozo Harimaya

    (Faculty of Economics, Sapporo Gakuin University, Japan)

Abstract

This paper models the lobbying activity concerning a safeguard measure and applies it to the empirical analysis to see if the monitoring system on a safeguard measure is administered along with the WTO agreement or affected by political factors. The model analysis describes that there exists a potential mechanism that a rise in imports induces a political activity by producers. The empirical analysis shows that the monitoring system on a safeguard measure is not so neutral to the WTO conditions and it is more or less influenced by the political factors.

Suggested Citation

  • Koichi Kagitani & Hirofumi Tominaga & Kozo Harimaya, 2003. "The Economics and Politics of Administered Protection: An Analysis of the Japanese Safeguard System for Agricultural Goods," Discussion Paper Series 136, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.
    • Handle: RePEc:kob:dpaper:136
    as

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    File URL: https://www.rieb.kobe-u.ac.jp/academic/ra/dp/English/dp136.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2003
    Download Restriction: no
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Administered protection; Safeguard; Lobbying; WTO agreement;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption

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