IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/kgu/wpaper/110.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Pareto-improving tariff-tax reforms under imperfect competition

Author

Listed:
  • Kenji Fujiwara

    (School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University)

Abstract

Constructing a duopoly model with non-constant marginal costs and a strict Pareto criterion, this paper examines welfare effects of world-price-fixing tariff reductions accompanied by adjustments of a domestic tax. If a destination-based consumption tax is used, this reform achieves a strict Pareto improvement under sufficiently decreasing marginal costs. If, in contrast, an origin-based production tax is employed, a strict Pareto improvement holds whether marginal cost is decreasing or not. Thus, we can conclude that tariff-tax reforms that improve the world welfare and are irrelevant of tax bases are possible if the targeted industry exhibits sufficiently decreasing marginal costs.

Suggested Citation

  • Kenji Fujiwara, 2013. "Pareto-improving tariff-tax reforms under imperfect competition," Discussion Paper Series 110, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, revised Oct 2013.
    • Handle: RePEc:kgu:wpaper:110
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://192.218.163.163/RePEc/pdf/kgdp110.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2013
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Andreas Haufler & Michael Pflüger, 2004. "International Commodity Taxation under Monopolistic Competition," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 6(3), pages 445-470, August.
    2. Keen, Michael & Lahiri, Sajal, 1998. "The comparison between destination and origin principles under imperfect competition," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 323-350, August.
    3. Zhang, Anming & Zhang, Yimin, 1998. "An analysis of import protection as export promotion under economies of scale," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 199-219, April.
    4. Bagwell, Kyle & Staiger, Robert W., 2012. "The economics of trade agreements in the linear Cournot delocation model," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 32-46.
    5. Keen, Michael & Lahiri, Sajal & Raimondos-Moller, Pascalis, 2002. "Tax principles and tax harmonization under imperfect competition: A cautionary example," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(8), pages 1559-1568, September.
    6. Keen, Michael & Lahiri, Sajal, 1993. "Domestic tax reform and international oligopoly," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 55-74, May.
    7. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2012. "Profit Shifting And Trade Agreements In Imperfectly Competitive Markets," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 53(4), pages 1067-1104, November.
    8. Hatzipanayotou, Panos & Michael, Michael S. & Miller, Stephen M., 1994. "Win-win indirect tax reform : A modest proposal," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 44(1-2), pages 147-151.
    9. Jota Ishikawa & Tomohiro Kuroda, 2007. "How Effective are Emissions Taxes in an Open Economy?," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(2), pages 359-368, May.
    10. Christos Kotsogiannis & Miguel-Angel Lopez-Garcia, 2007. "Imperfect competition, indirect tax harmonization and public goods," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 14(2), pages 135-149, April.
    11. Parai, Amar K., 1999. "Profit tax and tariff under international oligopoly," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 317-326, September.
    12. Jota Ishikawa & Hiroshi Mukunoki, 2008. "Spillover Effects Of Economic Integration In A Three‐Country Model," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 59(2), pages 211-227, June.
    13. Michael Keen & Jenny E. Ligthart, 2005. "Coordinating Tariff Reduction and Domestic Tax Reform under Imperfect Competition," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(2), pages 385-390, May.
    14. Lahiri, Sajal & Raimondos-Moller, Pascalis, 1997. "On the tying of aid to tariff reform," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 479-491, December.
    15. Baier, Scott L. & Bergstrand, Jeffrey H., 2001. "The growth of world trade: tariffs, transport costs, and income similarity," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 1-27, February.
    16. Keen, Michael & Ligthart, Jenny E., 2002. "Coordinating tariff reduction and domestic tax reform," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 489-507, March.
    17. Ourania Karakosta & Christos Kotsogiannis & Miguel-Angel Lopez-Garcia, 2014. "Indirect tax harmonization and global public goods," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 21(1), pages 29-49, February.
    18. Jota Ishikawa & Hiroshi Mukunoki, 2008. "Effects of Multilateral Trade Liberalization on Prices," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(1), pages 37-44, February.
    19. Robert W. Staiger & Kyle Bagwell, 1999. "An Economic Theory of GATT," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 215-248, March.
    20. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 2011. "What Do Trade Negotiators Negotiate About? Empirical Evidence from the World Trade Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(4), pages 1238-1273, June.
    21. Nigar Hashimzade & Hassan Khodavaisi & Gareth Myles, 2005. "Tax Principles, Product Differentiation and the Nature of Competition," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 12(6), pages 695-712, November.
    22. Kemp, Murray C. & Wan, Henry Jr., 1976. "An elementary proposition concerning the formation of customs unions," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 95-97, February.
    23. Jota Ishikawa, 2004. "From Segmented Markets to Integrated Markets: an Analysis of Economic Integration and Antidumping Legislation," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(4), pages 706-722, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Kieun Shim & Kyonghwa Jeong, 2016. "Revenue-enhancing Trade Liberalization in a Differentiated Duopoly," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(2), pages 561-573, May.
    2. Hamid Beladi & Avik Chakrabarti & Sugata Marjit, 2016. "Competitive General Equilibrium with Finite Change and Theory of Policy Making," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(1), pages 1-7, March.
    3. Zhang, Ting & Wang, Yulan & Shen, Bin & Prak, Dennis, 2023. "Welfare-maximizing tariff versus trade-surplus-maximizing tariff: Impacts on multinational firm competition," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 264(C).
    4. Zou, Yuxiang & Chen, Tai-Liang, 2016. "International joint venture and welfare-improving tariff-tax reforms," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 27-35.
    5. Chang, Yang-Ming & Sargsyan, Ruben, 2022. "Revenue-neutral or profit-neutral tariff and tax reforms under imperfect competition: Welfare implications," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 1-11.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Kenji Fujiwara, 2016. "Tax Principles and Tariff-Tax Reforms under International Oligopoly," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 18(1), pages 84-98, February.
    2. Kenji Fujiwara, 2014. "Tax Principles and Coordination of Trade and Domestic Policies Under Imperfect Competition," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(1-2), pages 29-40, June.
    3. Kenji Fujiwara, 2013. "A Win–Win–Win Tariff–Tax Reform under Imperfect Competition," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(5), pages 857-867, November.
    4. Kenji Fujiwara & Ryoma Kitamura, 2014. "A trade and domestic tax reform in imperfectly competitive markets," The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(6), pages 785-795, September.
    5. Ourania Karakosta & Christos Kotsogiannis & Miguel-Angel Lopez-Garcia, 2014. "Indirect tax harmonization and global public goods," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 21(1), pages 29-49, February.
    6. Kenji Fujiwara, 2015. "Tax Principles and Tariff-Tax Reforms," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 71(3), pages 360-370, September.
    7. Christos Kotsogiannis & Miguel-Angel Lopez-Garcia, 2007. "Imperfect competition, indirect tax harmonization and public goods," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 14(2), pages 135-149, April.
    8. Ourania Karakosta & Christos Kotsogiannis & Miguel-Angel Lopez-Garcia, 2009. "Does Indirect Tax Harmonization Deliver Pareto Improvements in the Presence of Global Public Goods?," CESifo Working Paper Series 2668, CESifo.
    9. Kieun Shim & Kyonghwa Jeong, 2016. "Revenue-enhancing Trade Liberalization in a Differentiated Duopoly," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(2), pages 561-573, May.
    10. Ourania Karakosta & Nikos Tsakiris, 2014. "Can tariff and tax reforms deliver welfare improvements under imperfect competition?," The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(3), pages 315-328, April.
    11. repec:kgu:wpaper:99 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Sajal Lahiri & Peri Silva, 2016. "Potential Pareto-Improving Move Toward Most Favored Nation Tariffs," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 54(2), pages 1086-1104, April.
    13. Michael S. Michael & Sajal Lahiri & Panos Hatzipanayotou, 2015. "Piecemeal Reform of Domestic Indirect Taxes toward Uniformity in the Presence of Pollution: with and without a Revenue Constraint," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 17(2), pages 174-195, April.
    14. Fabio Antoniou & Panos Hatzipanayotou & Michael S. Michael & Nikos Tsakiris, 2022. "Tax competition in the presence of environmental spillovers," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 29(3), pages 600-626, June.
    15. Raimondos, Pascalis & Woodland, Alan, 2018. "Reciprocity in trade negotiations and welfare," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 134-142.
    16. Kenji Fujiwara & Ryoma Kitamura, 2012. "A Tariff-Tax Reform under Oligopoly and Free Entry," Discussion Paper Series 88, School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University, revised Apr 2012.
    17. Amèvi Rocard Kouwoaye, 2019. "Trade tax reforms and poverty in developing countries: Why do some countries benefit and others lose?," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2019-66, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    18. Zou, Yuxiang & Chen, Tai-Liang, 2016. "International joint venture and welfare-improving tariff-tax reforms," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 27-35.
    19. Maggi, Giovanni, 2014. "International Trade Agreements," Handbook of International Economics, in: Gopinath, G. & Helpman, . & Rogoff, K. (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 0, pages 317-390, Elsevier.
    20. Panos Hatzipanayotou & Sajal Lahiri & Michael Michael, 2011. "Trade and domestic tax reforms in the presence of a public good and different neutrality conditions," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 18(3), pages 273-290, June.
    21. Wisarut Suwanprasert, 2020. "The role of the most favored nation principle of the GATT/WTO in the New Trade model," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(3), pages 760-798, August.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    tariff-tax reform; destination principle; origin principle; strict Pareto improvement/deterioration; duopoly;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kgu:wpaper:110. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Toshihiro Okada (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/dekgujp.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.