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Internal and external political competition

Author

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  • David Hugh-Jones

Abstract

All rulers face political competition, both from rivals within their state, and from other states to which their subjects may exit. In a simple model, both kinds of competition are substitutes. Internal competition (democracy) bene?ts citizens by allowing them to replace rent-seeking rulers. But it also weakens these rulers' incentives to invest. External competition forces rent-seeking rulers to invest so as to prevent migration. As a result, citizens are less willing to ?ght for democracy, and rulers are less eager to oppose it, when external competition is high. In a panel of countries, there are fewer changes towards democracy when states have low GDP relative to their neighbours.

Suggested Citation

  • David Hugh-Jones, 2009. "Internal and external political competition," Jena Economics Research Papers 2009-067, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
  • Handle: RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2009-067
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    File URL: https://oweb.b67.uni-jena.de/Papers/jerp2009/wp_2009_067.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. Libman, Alexander & Herrmann-Pillath, Carsten & Yadav, Gaurav, 2013. "Are human rights and economic well-being substitutes? The evidence from migration patterns across the Indian states," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 139-164.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    political competition; dictatorship; democracy; transitions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism

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