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Determinants of In-group Bias: Group Affiliation or Guilt-aversion?

Author

Listed:
  • Werner Güth

    (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group, Jena, Germany)

  • Matteo Ploner

    (Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group, Jena, Germany)

  • Tobias Regner

    (Friedrich Schiller University, Jena, Germany)

Abstract

In-group favoritism in social dilemma situations is one of the main findings of studies in Social Identity Theory. We investigate what causes the in-group bias: is it due to mere group affiliation or, alternatively, is guilt-aversion a possible explanation? We induce group membership in a minimal group setting, observe in-/out-group transfers and elicit re- spective beliefs. We ?nd that mere group affiliation affects beliefs and explains a substantial part of the bias, but we also ?nd evidence in favor of guilt-aversion as a source of motivation.

Suggested Citation

  • Werner Güth & Matteo Ploner & Tobias Regner, 2008. "Determinants of In-group Bias: Group Affiliation or Guilt-aversion?," Jena Economics Research Papers 2008-046, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
    • Handle: RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2008-046
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    File URL: https://oweb.b67.uni-jena.de/Papers/jerp2008/wp_2008_046.pdf
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    social preferences; experiments; social dilemma; group identity; guilt aversion;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations

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