Listen: I am angry! An experiment comparing ways of revealing emotions
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Cited by:
- Güth, Werner & Kliemt, Hartmut, 2010.
"What ethics can learn from experimental economics -- If anything,"
European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 302-310, September.
- Werner Güth & Hartmut Kliemt, 2008. "What Ethics Can Learn From Experimental Economics - If Anything," Jena Economics Research Papers 2008-062, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
- Josie I. Chen & Kenju Kamei, 2018.
"Disapproval aversion or inflated inequity acceptance? The impact of expressing emotions in ultimatum bargaining,"
Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 21(4), pages 836-857, December.
- Josie I Chen & Kenju Kamei, 2017. "Disapproval Aversion or Inflated Inequity Acceptance? The Impact of Expressing Emotions in Ultimatum Bargaining," Department of Economics Working Papers 2017_10, Durham University, Department of Economics.
- Anastasios Koukoumelis & M. Vittoria Levati, 2014. "Does expressing disapproval influence future cooperation? - An experimental study," Jena Economics Research Papers 2014-022, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
- Samahita, Margaret, 2017.
"Venting and gossiping in conflicts: Verbal expression in ultimatum games,"
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 111-121.
- Samahita, Margaret, 2015. "Venting and Gossiping in Conflicts: Emotion Expression in Ultimatum Games," Working Papers 2015:33, Lund University, Department of Economics.
- Chen, Josie I & Kamei, Kenju, 2014. "Expressing Emotion and Fairness Crowding-out in an Ultimatum Game with Incomplete Information," MPRA Paper 54405, University Library of Munich, Germany.
More about this item
Keywords
Ultimatum bargaining; Public goods game; Outrage; Punishment;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CBE-2007-12-08 (Cognitive and Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EVO-2007-12-08 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2007-12-08 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2007-12-08 (Game Theory)
- NEP-PBE-2007-12-08 (Public Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2007-12-08 (Social Norms and Social Capital)
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