IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/jet/dpaper/dpaper54.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Integration versus Outsourcing in Stable Industry Equilibrium with Communication Networks

Author

Listed:
  • Okamoto, Yusuke

Abstract

For the selection of a firm's structure between vertical integration and arm's-length outsourcing, the importance of the thickness of the market had been emphasized in the previous literature. Here we take account of communication networks such as telephone, telex, fax, and the Internet. By doing so, we could illustrate the relationship between communication networks and the make-or-buy decision. With communication network technology differing in each type of firm, both vertically integrated firms and arm's-length outsourcing firms coexist, which was never indicated in the previous literature. However, when common network technology is introduced, such coexistence generically does not occur.

Suggested Citation

  • Okamoto, Yusuke, 2006. "Integration versus Outsourcing in Stable Industry Equilibrium with Communication Networks," IDE Discussion Papers 54, Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization(JETRO).
    • Handle: RePEc:jet:dpaper:dpaper54
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://ir.ide.go.jp/?action=repository_action_common_download&item_id=38112&item_no=1&attribute_id=22&file_no=1
    File Function: First version, 2006
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-1158, December.
    2. Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 2003. "Outsourcing Versus FDI in Industry Equilibrium," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(2-3), pages 317-327, 04/05.
    3. Robert C. Feenstra, 1998. "Integration of Trade and Disintegration of Production in the Global Economy," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 31-50, Fall.
    4. Robert C. Feenstra & Gordon H. Hanson, 2005. "Ownership and Control in Outsourcing to China: Estimating the Property-Rights Theory of the Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 120(2), pages 729-761.
    5. Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 2005. "Outsourcing in a Global Economy," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 72(1), pages 135-159.
    6. Pol Antràs, 2003. "Firms, Contracts, and Trade Structure," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 118(4), pages 1375-1418.
    7. Pol Antras & Elhanan Helpman, 2004. "Global Sourcing," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(3), pages 552-580, June.
    8. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
    9. Jose Campa & Linda S. Goldberg, 1997. "The Evolving External Orientation of Manufacturing Industries: Evidence from Four Countries," NBER Working Papers 5919, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. John McLaren, 2000. ""Globalization" and Vertical Structure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(5), pages 1239-1254, December.
    11. Richard G. Harris, 1995. "Trade and Communication Costs," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 28(s1), pages 46-75, November.
    12. repec:hrv:faseco:4784029 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 2002. "Integration versus Outsourcing in Industry Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 117(1), pages 85-120.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Elhanan Helpman, 2006. "Trade, FDI, and the Organization of Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(3), pages 589-630, September.
    2. Dermot Leahy & Catia Montagna, 2006. "'Make-or-Buy' in International Oligopoly and the Role of Competitive Pressure," Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics 197, Economic Studies, University of Dundee.
    3. Liza Jabbour, 2012. "‘Slicing the Value Chain’ Internationally: Empirical Evidence on the Offshoring Strategy by French Firms," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(11), pages 1417-1447, November.
    4. Bas, Maria & Carluccio, Juan, 2009. "Wage bargaining and the boundaries of the multinational firm," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 28700, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    5. Marcella Nicolini, 2007. "Institutions and Offshoring Decision," CESifo Working Paper Series 2074, CESifo.
    6. Pol Antràs & Robert W. Staiger, 2012. "Offshoring and the Role of Trade Agreements," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(7), pages 3140-3183, December.
    7. Cheng, Chen, 2011. "Information, incentives and multinational firms," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 147-158, September.
    8. Dermot Leahy & Catia Montagna, 2011. "Economising, Strategising and the Decision to Outsource," Discussion Papers 11/17, University of Nottingham, GEP.
    9. Fabrice Defever & Farid Toubal, 2007. "Productivity and the Sourcing Modes of Multinational Firms: Evidence from French Firm-Level Data," CEP Discussion Papers dp0842, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
    10. Nathan Nunn, 2007. "Relationship-Specificity, Incomplete Contracts, and the Pattern of Trade," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 122(2), pages 569-600.
    11. Ottaviano, Gianmarco & Naghavi, Alireza, 2006. "Outsourcing, Contracts and Innovation Networks," CEPR Discussion Papers 5681, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Evelina Mengova, 2014. "Quality of Institutions and Outsourcing," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 28(4), pages 639-659, December.
    13. Marta Bernasconi & Sara Galetti & Valeria Gattai & Piergiovanna Natale, 2022. "Contract Incompleteness and the Boundaries of the Firm in Times of COVID-19," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 371-409, December.
    14. Li, Ben & Lu, Yi, 2009. "Geographic concentration and vertical disintegration: Evidence from China," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 294-304, May.
    15. Barbara Spencer, 2005. "International outsourcing and incomplete contracts," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 38(4), pages 1107-1135, November.
    16. Ma, Yue & Qu, Baozhi & Zhang, Yifan, 2010. "Judicial quality, contract intensity and trade: Firm-level evidence from developing and transition countries," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 146-159, June.
    17. Gregory Corcos & Delphine M. Irac & Giordano Mion & Thierry Verdier, 2013. "The Determinants of Intrafirm Trade: Evidence from French Firms," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 95(3), pages 825-838, July.
    18. Juan Carluccio & Thibault Fally, 2012. "Global Sourcing under Imperfect Capital Markets," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 94(3), pages 740-763, August.
    19. Patrik Karpaty & Patrik Gustavsson Tingvall, 2015. "Offshoring and Home Country R&D," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(4), pages 655-676, April.
    20. Defever, Fabrice & Toubal, Farid, 2013. "Productivity, relationship-specific inputs and the sourcing modes of multinationals," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 345-357.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Buyer-supplier relationship ; Communication networks; International outsourcing; Vertical integration; Communication; Network; Industrial management; Telecommunication; コミュニケーション; ネットワーク; 企業経営; 電信; 336;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:jet:dpaper:dpaper54. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Michitaka Imamitsu (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/idegvjp.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.