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Das Vertrauensspiel - eine verhaltensorientierte Erklärung

Author

Listed:
  • Markus Pasche

    (University of Jena, Faculty of Economics)

Abstract

Es besteht empirische Evidenz, dass reale Spieler weitaus mehr Vertrauen und Vertrauenswürdigkeit entwickeln als es nach den Voraussagen der klassischen Spieltheorie rational ist. Das Papier skizziert den Indirekt Evolutionären Ansatz zur Erklärung der Entstehung von Vertrauen nach Güth und Kliemt (2000). Nach einer kurzen methodischen Diskussion des Ansatzes wird dessen Ergebnis im Rahmen eines alternativen verhaltensorientierten Erklärungsmodells zunächst reproduziert und durch den Aspekt der sozialen Integration erweitert. Es zeigt sich, dass eine Senkung der Screening-Kosten die Investitionen in soziale Integration zurückdrängt.

Suggested Citation

  • Markus Pasche, 2005. "Das Vertrauensspiel - eine verhaltensorientierte Erklärung," Jenaer Schriften zur Wirtschaftswissenschaft (Expired!) 19/2005, Friedrich Schiller University of Jena, School of of Economics and Business Administration.
    • Handle: RePEc:jen:jenasw:2005-19
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    beschränkte Rationalität; indirekte Evolution; intrinsische Motivation; regelbasiertes Verhalten; Screening; soziale Integration.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B41 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - Economic Methodology
    • B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary; Modern Monetary Theory;
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General

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