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Financial Supervision Fragmentation and Central Bank Independence: The Two Sides of the Same Coin?

Author

Listed:
  • Andreas Freytag

    (University of Jena, Faculty of Economics)

  • Donato Masciandaro

    (Paolo Baffi Centre, Bocconi University, Milan, and Department of Economics, Mathematics and Statistics, University of Lecce)

Abstract

This paper analyses how the central banks role in the monetary institutional setting can affect the unification process of the overall financial supervision architecture. Using indicators of monetary commitment and central bank independence, we claim that these legal proxies show an inverse link with financial supervision unification. Therefore, the trade off still holds between the supervisory and the central bank involvement per se, however, monetary commitment and independence do also matter. In this respect, in an institutional setting characterized by a central bank deeply and successfully involved in supervision, or legally independent, a multi-authority model is likely to occur.

Suggested Citation

  • Andreas Freytag & Donato Masciandaro, 2005. "Financial Supervision Fragmentation and Central Bank Independence: The Two Sides of the Same Coin?," Jenaer Schriften zur Wirtschaftswissenschaft (Expired!) 14/2005, Friedrich Schiller University of Jena, School of of Economics and Business Administration.
    • Handle: RePEc:jen:jenasw:2005-14
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Financial Supervision; Single Authority; Central Bank Independence; Monetary Commitment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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