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Pre-play communication and coordination in two-player games

Author

Listed:
  • José E. Vila

    (Universitat de València)

  • Amparo Urbano Salvador

    (Universitat de València)

Abstract

The main result of this paper is that any correlated equlibrium pay-off of a two-player completeinformation game with rational parameters can be reached through an unmediated costlesspre-play conversation scheme. This problem was left open by Barany and Forges' analysis. Ourcommunication protocol does not rely on external mediators of any kind. It is also self-enforcing(in the sense that no player has an incentive to deviate if the other does not) and quasi-sure (inthe sense that a 'deviation from the rules' of a player can be detected by the other with aprobability as close as one as we want). Coordination failures that may arise in many economicsituations are solved by applying our pre-play communication scheme.

Suggested Citation

  • José E. Vila & Amparo Urbano Salvador, 1997. "Pre-play communication and coordination in two-player games," Working Papers. Serie AD 1997-26, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  • Handle: RePEc:ivi:wpasad:1997-26
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    File URL: http://www.ivie.es/downloads/docs/wpasad/wpasad-1997-26.pdf
    File Function: Fisrt version / Primera version, 1997
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Indrajit Ray, 2002. "Multiple Equilibrium Problem and Non-Canonical Correlation Devices," Working Papers 2002-24, Brown University, Department of Economics.
    2. GOSSNER, Olivier, 1998. "Repeated games played by cryptographically sophisticated players," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1998035, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).

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