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Legal Protection: Liability and Immunity Arrangements of Central Banks and Financial Supervisors

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  • Mr. Ashraf Khan

Abstract

This paper argues that central bank legal protection contributes to safeguarding a central bank and its financial supervisor’s independence, especially for conducting monetary and financial stability policy. However, such legal protection also entails enhanced accountability. To this end, the paper provides a selected overview of legal protection for central banks and financial supervisors (if the supervisor is part of the central bank), focusing on liability, immunity, and indemnification arrangements, and based on the IMF’s Central Bank Legislation Database. The paper also uses data from the IMF’s Article IV and FSAP Database, and the IMF MCM’s Technical Assistance Database. It lists selected country cases for illustrative purposes. It introduces the concepts of “appropriate legal protection” and “function-specific legal protection” as topics for further research.

Suggested Citation

  • Mr. Ashraf Khan, 2018. "Legal Protection: Liability and Immunity Arrangements of Central Banks and Financial Supervisors," IMF Working Papers 2018/176, International Monetary Fund.
  • Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2018/176
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mr. Ashraf Khan, 2016. "Central Bank Governance and the Role of Nonfinancial Risk Management," IMF Working Papers 2016/034, International Monetary Fund.
    2. Ms. JoAnne Morris & Mr. Tonny Lybek, 2004. "Central Bank Governance: A Survey of Boards and Management," IMF Working Papers 2004/226, International Monetary Fund.
    3. Mr. Ashraf Khan, 2017. "Central Bank Legal Frameworks in the Aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis," IMF Working Papers 2017/101, International Monetary Fund.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ampudia, Miguel & Beck, Thorsten & Beyer, Andreas & Colliard, Jean-Edouard & Leonello, Agnese & Maddaloni, Angela & Marqués-Ibáñez, David, 2019. "The architecture of supervision," Working Paper Series 2287, European Central Bank.
    2. repec:ecb:ecbdps:20199 is not listed on IDEAS

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