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Asset Securitization and Optimal Retention

Author

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  • Mr. John Kiff
  • Michael Kisser

Abstract

This paper builds on recent research by Fender and Mitchell (2009) who show that if financial institutions securitize loans, retaining an interest in the equity tranche does not always induce the securitizer to diligently screen borrowers ex ante. We first determine the conditions under which this scenario becomes binding and further illustrate the implications for capital requirements. We then propose an extension to the existing model and also solve for optimal retention size. This also allows us to capture feedback effects from capital requirements into the maximization problem. Preliminary results show that equity tranche retention continues to best incentivize loan screening.

Suggested Citation

  • Mr. John Kiff & Michael Kisser, 2010. "Asset Securitization and Optimal Retention," IMF Working Papers 2010/074, International Monetary Fund.
  • Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2010/074
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Bougheas, Spiros & Worrall, Tim, 2019. "Portfolio sales and signaling," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 182-191.
    2. Kiff, John & Kisser, Michael, 2014. "A shot at regulating securitization," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 10(C), pages 32-49.
    3. Chen, Zhizhen & Liu, Frank Hong & Opong, Kwaku & Zhou, Mingming, 2017. "Short-term safety or long-term failure? Empirical evidence of the impact of securitization on bank risk," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 48-74.
    4. Guo, Guixia & Wu, Ho-Mou, 2014. "A study on risk retention regulation in asset securitization process," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 61-71.
    5. Gehrig, Thomas & Bester, Helmut & ,, 2012. "Loan Sales and Screening Incentives," CEPR Discussion Papers 9084, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. International Monetary Fund, 2011. "Germany: Technical Note on the Future of German Mortgage-Backed Covered Bond (PF and Brief) and Securitization Markets," IMF Staff Country Reports 2011/369, International Monetary Fund.
    7. Georges Dionne & Sara Malekan, 2017. "Optimal Form of Retention for Securitized Loans under Moral Hazard," Risks, MDPI, vol. 5(4), pages 1-13, October.
    8. Mr. Stijn Claessens & Ms. Laura E. Kodres, 2014. "The Regulatory Responses to the Global Financial Crisis: Some Uncomfortable Questions," IMF Working Papers 2014/046, International Monetary Fund.

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