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Seductions of an Underdevelopment Trap: Systemic Impediments to Agricultural Reform in Russia

Author

Listed:
  • Mr. Dmitry Gershenson
  • Ms. Maria Amelina

Abstract

Despite ambitious agricultural reforms initiated by the federal government, inefficient and unprofitable producers predominate in post-Soviet Russia. However, in some regions a more robust restructuring has taken place. Observing two Russian regions-one with substantially restructured agricultural production, and one in which Soviet-style coordination predominates-we develop a model of the interactions between political and economic incentives that lead to these divergent outcomes. The model identifies region- and sector-specific characteristics that encourage some regional governments to maintain Soviet-style redistribution structures and make producers forsake more efficient outcomes as more costly, while encouraging other regions to pursue reform.

Suggested Citation

  • Mr. Dmitry Gershenson & Ms. Maria Amelina, 2002. "Seductions of an Underdevelopment Trap: Systemic Impediments to Agricultural Reform in Russia," IMF Working Papers 2002/126, International Monetary Fund.
    • Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2002/126
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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