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Districting and Government Overspending

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  • Reza Baqir

Abstract

The common-pool problem is a central issue in the relationship between the political structure of jurisdictions and the size of public spending. Models predict that, other things being equal, greater political districting of a jurisdiction raises the scale of government. This paper presents new evidence on this and related predictions from a cross-section of city governments in the United States. The main finding is that one additional legislator is associated, on average, with 3 percent larger expenditures per capita. Evidence also suggests that forms of government with strong executives, particularly those with veto powers, break the link between districting and government size.

Suggested Citation

  • Reza Baqir, 2001. "Districting and Government Overspending," IMF Working Papers 2001/096, International Monetary Fund.
    • Handle: RePEc:imf:imfwpa:2001/096
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    Cited by:

    1. Dhammika Dharmapala, 2002. "The Congressional Budget Process and the Aggregate Level of Spending," Working papers 2002-13, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.

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