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Sovereign Debt Structure for Crisis Prevention

Author

Listed:
  • Mr. Eduardo Borensztein
  • Mr. Olivier D Jeanne
  • Mr. Paolo Mauro
  • Mr. Jeromin Zettelmeyer
  • Mr. Marcos d Chamon

Abstract

The debate on government debt in the context of possible reforms of the international financial architecture has thus far focused on crisis resolution. This paper seeks to broaden this debate. It asks how government debt could be structured to pursue other objectives, including crisis prevention, international risk-sharing, and facilitating the adjustment of fiscal variables to changes in domestic economic conditions. To that end, the paper considers recently developed analytical approaches to improving sovereign debt structure using existing instruments, and reviews a number of proposals--including the introduction of explicit seniority and GDP-linked instruments--in the sovereign context.

Suggested Citation

  • Mr. Eduardo Borensztein & Mr. Olivier D Jeanne & Mr. Paolo Mauro & Mr. Jeromin Zettelmeyer & Mr. Marcos d Chamon, 2005. "Sovereign Debt Structure for Crisis Prevention," IMF Occasional Papers 2005/001, International Monetary Fund.
    • Handle: RePEc:imf:imfops:2005/001
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. María José Gil-Moltó & Joanna Poyago-Theotoky & Vasileios Zikos, 2006. "R&D policy and privatization in a mixed oligopoly," Discussion Paper Series 2006_25, Department of Economics, Loughborough University.
    2. Eduardo Borensztein & Eduardo Cavallo & Patricio Valenzuela, 2009. "Debt Sustainability Under Catastrophic Risk: The Case for Government Budget Insurance," Risk Management and Insurance Review, American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 12(2), pages 273-294, September.
    3. Mengus, E., 2014. "Honoring Sovereign Debt or Bailing Out Domestic Residents: A Theory of Internal Costs of Default," Working papers 480, Banque de France.
    4. Laura Alfaro & Fabio Kanczuk, 2009. "Debt Maturity: Is Long‐Term Debt Optimal?," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(5), pages 890-905, November.
    5. Grobéty, Mathieu, 2018. "Government debt and growth: The role of liquidity," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 1-22.
    6. Luis Opazo & Claudio Raddatz & Sergio L. Schmukler, 2015. "Institutional Investors and Long-Term Investment: Evidence from Chile," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 29(3), pages 479-522.
    7. Eduardo Cavallo & Ilan Noy, 2009. "The Economics of Natural Disasters: A Survey," Research Department Publications 4649, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    8. José Antonio Ocampo & Germán D. Orbegozo & Mauricio Villamizar-Villegas & Nicolás Fajardo-Baquero & Oscar Botero-Ramírez & Camilo OrozcoVanegas, 2020. "Post-graduation from the original sin problem The effects of investor participation on sovereign debt markets," Borradores de Economia 1113, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.
    9. Opazo, Luis & Raddatz, Claudio & Schmukler, Sergio L., 2009. "The long and the short of emerging market debt," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5056, The World Bank.
    10. Mark Wright, 2018. "The Seniority Structure of Sovereign Debt," 2018 Meeting Papers 928, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    11. Mete Feridun, 2006. "Currency Crises in Emerging Markets: An Application of Signals Approach to Turkey," Discussion Paper Series 2006_26, Department of Economics, Loughborough University, revised Dec 2006.
    12. Christoph Trebesch & Mr. Michael G. Papaioannou & Mr. Udaibir S Das, 2012. "Sovereign Debt Restructurings 1950-2010: Literature Survey, Data, and Stylized Facts," IMF Working Papers 2012/203, International Monetary Fund.
    13. Pina, Gonçalo, 2024. "State-contingent debt with lender risk aversion," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 180-189.
    14. Ugo Panizza & Federico Sturzenegger & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2010. "International Government Debt," Business School Working Papers 2010-03, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
    15. Stephen Quinn, 2008. "Securitization of Sovereign Debt: Corporations as a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism in Britain, 1694-1750," Working Papers 200701, Texas Christian University, Department of Economics.
    16. Hefeker, Carsten, 2006. "Vermeidung und Bewältigung von Verschuldungskrisen: Die Rolle privater und öffentlicher Institutionen," HWWA Discussion Papers 340, Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWA).
    17. Gondo, Rocío, 2014. "State Contingent Assets, Financial Crises and Pecuniary Externalities in Models with Collateral Constraints," Working Papers 2014-001, Banco Central de Reserva del Perú.

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