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After Argentina

Author

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  • Anna Gelpern

    (Peterson Institute for International Economics)

Abstract

Has the biggest sovereign debt default in history passed without answering the urgent legal and policy questions it posed, and with barely a ripple in the global financial markets? So far, pretty much. Lawsuits have not yielded a penny for the creditors. They failed to stop the spring 2005 debt exchange or dent Argentina's recovery. Bondholders failed to stick together; the markets failed to banish a defaulter; and the official sector failed to change the outcome. Thanks to brisk growth and impressive fiscal management in Argentina, the 2001 default seems to be fading into the night. But it is still too early to tell how Argentina might have changed the world. We may not know for years. For now, the revolution must wait.

Suggested Citation

  • Anna Gelpern, 2005. "After Argentina," Policy Briefs PB05-02, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:iie:pbrief:pb05-02
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    File URL: https://www.piie.com/publications/policy-briefs/after-argentina
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Michael Mussa, 2002. "Argentina and the Fund: From Triumph to Tragedy," Peterson Institute Press: Policy Analyses in International Economics, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number pa67, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Dania Thomas & Javier García-Fronti, 2007. "Good faith in sovereign debt restructuring: the evolution of an open norm in ‘localised’ contexts?," WEF Working Papers 0017, ESRC World Economy and Finance Research Programme, Birkbeck, University of London.
    2. Mr. Bjoern Rother & Ms. Ivetta Hakobyan & Mrs. Monica B de Bolle, 2006. "The Level and Composition of Public Sector Debt in Emerging Market Crises," IMF Working Papers 2006/186, International Monetary Fund.

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